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Charles Gordon Sinn 
A Comparative Social, Economic and Environmental Study of how Malta would 
best achieve its 2020 “20-20-20” goals 
The European Union has recognized the need for an action plan to facilitate the gradual 
transition to a dominant, renewable energy production base for the myriad of benefits 
that renewable over non-renewable production brings. Malta, as a member of the EU, is 
obliged to achieve nationwide goals as specified  in the Renewable Energy Directive 
with regards to electrical efficiency, carbon emissions and renewable energy production 
share. The goals for Malta include an achievement by 2020 of a 10 % renewable 
production base, a 10 % electrical efficiency improvement and an allowance for a 5 % 
increase in carbon emissions as compared to 2005 levels. This Dissertation examines 
four different comparative studies that address different aspects for attaining these 
Directive goals. The purpose of these comparative studies is to identify the best option in 
order to address a particular goal by applying social, economic and environmental 
weighting. The conclusions of this paper are that: 
i. Malta can achieve its efficiency goals simply by introducing improvements to its 
transmission and distribution grid. These grid improvement measures are cost effective 
and would facilitate attainment of the renewable and emissions goals.  
ii. Malta will need to expand its non-renewable production base by 2016 and the best 
option for such an expansion would be the addition of a second submarine 
interconnector to Sicily rather than expansion of local production capacity. 
iii. With a focus on the most cost-effective large scale renewable energy projects it was 
determined that it is both more economic and socially advantageous to invest in a foreign 
offshore wind project (and thus be credited with renewable energy produced from this 
source) rather than to build a local wind project.  
iv. Consumer end efficiency improvements where cost effective should also be 
aggressively pursued and represent a means for Malta to actually exceed its efficiency 
goal and result in electrical savings that save money and reduce emissions. 
 
MALTA, ENERGY, INTERCONNECTION, RENEWABLE, EU     
„MSc. SERM‟ / „MS. IS&T‟             
Michael Deaton, Robert Ghirlando, Jonathan Miles                        October 2010 
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This Dissertation is dedicated to Malta and its people. When I moved to the Island 
fifteen years ago the Maltese people welcomed me warmly and I soon felt at home even 
though I was a foreigner in a new country. I have lived the most enjoyable years of my 
life on this Island and when I first thought what my Dissertation would be about, I 
immediately focused on a topic of local significance, one that would have real relevance 
for the Island and its people. It is my hope that this dissertation can provide some help 
for the Island to achieve its 2020 renewable goals in the most optimal way possible.   
This Dissertation was accomplished with the thought of repaying the favor of the 
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It is often said that the only thing more important for a country than power is water. 
However, for Malta which has a deteriorating natural aquifer system and no clean 
surface freshwater to speak of, one could say that the two are equally important. Due to 
the deteriorating condition of the natural aquifer systems and their impact on water 
production (mainly due to unsustainable overexploitation resulting in poor water 
quality), production has been increasingly shifted to Reverse Osmosis with Plants 
(located at Pembroke, Cirkewwa and Ghar Lapsi) which currently supply more than 60 
% of the drinking water on the Maltese Islands. [1] The vulnerability of Malta‟s natural 
water system means that any long term blackout could result in an emergency situation 
where Malta would have to depend upon foreign imports of water. Additionally, 
electricity is the lifeline of modern society; and thus, populations are almost entirely 
dependent on it. Therefore any threat to future energy security must be taken very 
seriously. 
 
Malta is a country with a number of threats to its future energy security. Enemalta 
Corporation essentially holds a monopoly position on electricity production, supply and 
distribution due to lack of competition. This trend will continue for the foreseeable 
future due to the difficulty of market penetration as well as the government‟s propensity 
to subsidize electricity prices (by keeping the price of electricity lower than it costs to 
produce resulting in Enemalta losing money) for the sake of popularity. The result is a 
corporation that has over three hundred million Euros (as of 2007) in debt to loans [2] 
and which continues to lose money at an accelerated rate. [3] As a consequence 
Enemalta is unmotivated to be innovative and proactive in its energy policy, especially 
in terms of pursuing renewable investments as this would result in the spending of 
capital that it simply does not have, or incurring additional debt. 
 
Furthermore, Malta depends almost exclusively upon foreign imports of oil to fuel its 
generating facilities as it does not have any known exploitable fossil fuel resources. The 
only realistic prospect the country has to reduce its high dependence on foreign imports 
to fuel its non-renewable production facilities is to invest in power generation derived 
from renewable sources. With Malta‟s 2004 accession to the European Union (EU) and 
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subsequent kick start of its renewable energy interest due to the requirement that 10 % 
of electrical energy production be sourced from renewable sources by 2020, the country 
now has a genuine interest in increasing its energy security by investing in local 
production of renewable energy.  
 
Another prospect that Malta may consider in order to reduce dependence on fuel 
imports to is to lay a submarine cable to another country from where it may import 
electricity. One could say that this does not solve the problem of a transition to 
renewable energy; however, electrical interconnection brings with it a great number of 
benefits.  For instance, a trans-national cable could be used to import cheaper electricity, 
green electricity, and also might be used to stabilize the local energy ring as well as 
provide an emergency source for electricity should local production fail. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to outline how Malta has reached its present power 
situation, what the situation is today, why it is not sustainable, the different options 
Malta has available to meet its 2020 requirements by the EU for its renewable share, 





























Introduction to Malta 
Geography 
The Republic of Malta is an archipelago nation state and consists of three inhabited 
islands (and multiple non-inhabited micro islands) called Malta, Gozo, and Comino. 
The land area of Malta is 316 km
2 
[Appendix A-2].  It is located in the Mediterranean 
Sea [refer to Figure 1 for location] and is about 93 km south of Sicily and 288 km east 
of Tunisia. The fact that it is located right in the middle of the major (and only) nautical 
east-west shipping route through the Mediterranean has meant that the Island has 
throughout history possessed political power beyond its size [1]. Its central 
Mediterranean location has also resulted in thriving tourism (with over one million 




Figure 1: Map of Malta with Power Plants 
This map of Malta has been reproduced 
with permission from Ezilon, with addition 







 December 2008 the total population of the country of Malta was 413,609. [3] This 
number is based upon extrapolation from census surveys which are carried out on a decennial 
timeframe, with the last being in 2005.  
  
The island of Malta is by far the largest and most populated of the Maltese Islands with a total 
population of 382,177. Gozo is the second most populated with a total population of 31,432. 
Comino is by far the smallest and least populated inhabited island having a negligible farmer 
population of around 8. [3] 
 
The combination of land area and total population results in a population density of 1,309 
people/km
2
. This is by far the highest within the European Union. Malta‟s population density 
is over ten times the EU Average of 116 people/km
2
 and three times the next highest, the 
























Based upon the numbers plotted in Chart 1, it is expected that by 2020 Malta will have a 







As shown in Table 1 below, the total increase in non-Maltese population between 1985 and 
2008 has been 378%. The non-Maltese population in Malta has exploded since Malta‟s 2004 
accession to the EU with a 51.2% increase in non-Maltese population in just five years. This 
is compared to a mere 16% Maltese population increase between 1985 and 2008 and a 1.2% 
Maltese population increase between 2004 and 2008. The significance of these trends is that 
they forecast a continued flood of immigrants, mostly from other EU countries, that is 
expected to increase at an exponential rate. In addition to the obvious cultural ramifications of 






























Chart 1: Malta projected population for the next three 




immigrating citizens from other EU countries have higher energy footprints and higher 
standard of living expectation.  
 
 Total Maltese 
Non-
Maltese 
1985 Population 345,705 340,907 4,798 
2004 Population 402,668 390,669 11,999 
2008 Population 413,609 395,472 18,137 





Uniqueness of Malta‟s Situation and the Challenges it Poses 
Malta, as an island state with the smallest land mass and by far the highest density population 
in the European Union, faces a multitude of challenges in achieving macro oriented EU goals. 
On an island where available land is scarce and where a number of different human activities 
are concentrated in very small areas, a great number of problems arise when one attempts to 
resolve the need for new generation capacity, be it renewable or non-renewable. Non-
renewable fossil fuel generating facilities, no matter where they are located, will be no more 
than a few kilometers away from the nearest urban residential population centers.    
New generation capacity, if tackled on an industrial scale, requires a large amount of land 
which would almost undoubtedly have otherwise been used for a variety of other human uses. 
Such construction is almost always met with resistance from a segment of the public that often 
feels left out and marginalized by government interests. Renewable energy plants intended to 
serve on an industrial scale require a far greater amount of land per kWhr generating capacity 
than equivalent non-renewable facilities. The government has sought to address this problem 
by considering construction of large scale wind farms offshore, but offshore wind presents a 
variety of challenges. The offshore wind project that is being considered at present would be 
built at Sikka l-Bajda as this site presents relatively high sustained winds and shallow water 
depth. However, this area already also supports a large number of human uses such as scuba 
diving, fuel bunkering, and shipping. In addition such a construction could pose a potential 
hazard to migrating avian life, and since the location is visible from many of Malta‟s most 
Table 1:  Change of demographics for Malta with time, 
Numbers for Total population and Maltese population obtained 
from NSO report, Non-Maltese figure extrapolated [3]  
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popular northern beaches, many consider it a potential disruption to the aesthetic scenery and 
fear that tourism could be negatively impacted.  
This multitude and variety of conflicting human use interests set in a small area lead to 
„spatial misfits‟. The term „spatial misfits‟, as applied to Malta, was used by Eng. Charles 
Yousif  (Institute for Sustainable Energy, University of Malta) in a study he performed 
concerning Malta‟s RE policy implementation process and the resulting conundrum of 
applying EU policies to drastically different demographic situations.  
 
An excerpt from the „spatial misfit‟ study:  
“Malta is a highly interesting case for such study, since all levels of policy 
implementation are very closely knit…and consequently EU influences can  
be directly seen”…“insularity and size confine the actor network to a small  
group of multiple actors, often connected through friendships and familiar  
relationships as well as economical and financial ties. This creates personal and 
direct links between and within the governance levels, which are characterized by 
antagonism and/or sympathy and often follow unwritten rules.” [5] 
“Spatial misfits in a multi-level renewable energy policy implementation process on the Small 
Island State of Malta” Kotzebue, Yousif, et al. 
 
In addition to misfits arising from land-use conflicts there also is a high degree of misfits 
arising from the different levels of policy making lobbies and the different agendas that they 
have regarding renewable energy policy. For example, the Prime Minister can be considered 
the highest level policy maker for the Maltese Islands, but his agenda is very macro orientated 
as it is influenced by the highest level policy maker, the European Union. In this sense his 
agenda can be biased toward macro-scale projects that may be a better fit in another larger EU 
country rather than Malta. [6] 
 
“Small isolated system” status of Malta 
The original definition of a “small” island came from UNESCO‟s Man and the Biosphere 
Programme and is defined as an island with an area less than 10,000 km
2
 and a population of 
less than 500,000. [7] Within the EU this definition of a “small” island as applied to the EU 
was confirmed in the Treaty of Amsterdam. Notably, Gozo was confirmed even before 
Malta‟s accession to the EU as a member of the Small Islands Commission. [8] With Malta‟s 
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accession to the EU, the Nation itself became a member and received assistance from the EU 
Cohesion Fund. 
A “small isolated system” is defined by the EU‟s Electricity Liberalization Directive as one 
with “consumption less than 2500 GWh in the year 1996, where less than 5% of the annual 
consumption is obtained through interconnection with other systems”. [9] 
Malta will fit under the definition for a “small” island for the foreseeable future. Demographic 
projections predict that Malta‟s population will peak at 424,000 in 2025 and with an area of 
316 km
2 
it will fit well within the definition of a “small” island. The importance of this is that 
it will be entitled to special subsidies under the EU Cohesion Fund. 
 
The definition for a “Small isolated system” is more specific; Malta will likely fit under the 
electrical “consumption” clause given that even the highest estimates for the next 50 years in 
Malta are less than 2500 GWh. However, the definition includes a clause that states that a 
“Small isolated system” is one with less than 5% of annual consumption that is obtained 
through interconnections with other systems. The installation of the 200 MW Malta-Sicily 
cable (as will be discussed in detail in Section VI.2) could put this status in jeopardy since, 
even if the cable was used at only one quarter capacity to import electricity from Sicily then 
Malta would be obtaining more than 5% of its total electricity from an interconnection.  
 
The EU itself has recognized the fact that small islands require special treatment due to their 
unique socio-economic situations.  Small islands suffer from the fact that they tend to have 
small inefficient markets, limited local resources, require large amounts of imports that are 
expensive (due to costly transport links), have higher living costs and a sensitive natural 
environment. 
„Economies of scale‟ is a major factor in determining the economics behind power 
production. As a consequence of their status, small island states will have much lower 
economies of scale and will produce electricity at a higher cost per kilowatt hour. 
Technological improvements have reduced the impact of economies of scale with regard to 
construction of generating facilities; however, it is still a driver in determining factors such as 
fuel source. This fact rules out many other fuel alternatives for small isolated island states 
10 
 
such as natural gas and other fuels that are difficult to transport and which require a built up 
infrastructure with unique and large economies of scale just for the transportation. [10] 
EU directives and regulations are not always applicable in an island context and must be 
tailored in order to cater to the unique factors under which member island states exist. The EU 
has recognized this and has allocated additional funds to which islands are entitled in order to 
subsidize works deemed appropriate by the European Commission (EC). [11]   
 




Malta‟s early history of power generation was dictated by British policies and agendas when it 
existed under the direct rule of the British Empire until 21
st
 September 1964.  
 
In 1882 the first public use of electrical appliances occurred in the Maltese Islands. Electric 
lighting was first introduced during an opera at the Royal Opera House and later that year 
Piazza San Giorgio in Valletta was lit up by electric lighting. In 1890 plans were made for a 
wide-scale installation of electric lighting on the Maltese Islands along with the installation of 
generating capacity to supply the electricity. [12] 
 
In 1894 the public electricity service was formed. Between 1894 and 1896 “The Central 
Power Station” as it was known at the time was constructed at the limits of Floriana. The 
system consisted of four individual steam units which had a combined generating capacity of 
350kW. The following three decades saw a continued expansion of the electrical grid to meet 
demand (mostly from street lighting) and an expansion of the main power station.  
 
In 1925 the first generating capacity on the island of Gozo was installed to power street 
lighting. This generating capacity was expanded over the years to reach a total of 380 kW by 




In 1935 proposals for a larger generating plant were brought up due to the need for increased 
generating capacity to meet demand. These proposals included the reiteration of an earlier 
1920 recommendation for the conversion of the single-phase hundred cycle distribution 
network to a three-phase fifty cycle operation system which would be a costly investment but 
which would result in a much more efficient transmission grid. These plans were interrupted 
by the outbreak of war in Europe (1939-1945) and the subsequent devastation to the 
infrastructure of the Maltese Islands by relentless Axis bombing which was especially fierce 
during 1941-1943. In 1949 Malta received economic reparations under the Marshall Aid 
Scheme to finance the construction of a new power station and equipment to replace the 
outdated one in Floriana. [12] 
 
With the post-war grant funds, a new power station was constructed and inaugurated in 1953 
in the excavated galleries at the base of Jesuit Hill, Marsa. This original underground 
installation is known as Marsa “A”. The total installed capacity of this new station was 15 
MW.  [12] A feasibility study was commissioned by the government in 1954 to resolve the 
issue of supplying electricity to remote villages. The report included recommendations that it 
was more economical to supply Gozo from the power station in Malta. In 1957 there was a 
large scale extension to the electrical grid including the construction of two submarine cables 
from Marfa to Comino and from Comino to Gozo. In 1959 the power station in Gozo was 
permanently shut down and the island entered into a dependence on the main island of Malta 
for electricity.  [12] 
 
A further result of this study was the grid-wide conversion from single-phase hundred cycle to 
a three-phase fifty cycle. The conversion project lasted 3 years between 1954 and 1957 and 
included the laying of 11kV three-phase cables and the constructions of substations to connect 
the lines to the 415/240V rated mains.  [12] 
 
In 1965 a 5.7 MW gas turbo alternator was installed at the power station in Marsa. This 
additional installation essentially filled the underground tunnel which housed the first power 
station at Marsa and so it was decided to construct a new power station on the grounds over it. 
This new power station is now known as Marsa “B” power station. With the construction of 
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the new power station, the stations at Floriana and Corradino became defunct and were 
decommissioned in 1960 and 1992 respectively. [12] 
 
In 1966 the new power station, which is better known as the Marsa “B” Power Station, was 
inaugurated. The new power station was constructed with two 12.5 MW turbo alternator units. 
The Marsa “B” Power Station was further expanded over the years (1966-1990) until its total 
generating capacity ultimately reached 267 MW. [12] In 1992 the Delimara Power Station 
was commissioned.  Its original construction included two 60 MW conventional steam units. 
Delimara has been further expanded over the years to reach a total capacity of 304 MW. [13] 
 
Why this History is Important 
 
A glimpse into Malta‟s history of power generation reveals that all of the past production 
facilities were constructed (except for Marsa “B” and Delimara) and most of the transmission 
infrastructure was built while Malta was under the direct rule of the British Empire. Malta‟s 
energy policies were very much guided by British interests and much of the technology and 
expertise during this period was imported. However, Malta managed to proceed successfully 
without much incident on its own after a difficult and dramatic transition period that occurred 
after its Independence in 1964.  
 
 The Industrial Revolution saw Malta, along with the rest of Europe, develop a dependence on 
high density fuel sources to power the new marvelously productive machinery that brought 
about a period of unprecedented growth and development. During the period between the late 
1800s and early 1900s environmental considerations were barely a factor in determining 
energy policy. There were a number of reasons for this including, the lack of understanding of 
the implications of fossil fuel burning, cheap fossil fuels, and a lack of economical (as 
compared to non-renewable) renewable technology. Hydroelectric technology was the one 
economical renewable technology at the time, which in appropriate locations can be applied in 
an extremely efficient and cost effective way. Malta has no free-flowing rivers and so could 
not apply this technology while, technologies such as solar and wind had not yet been 
developed to function on an economical and commercial level. A glimpse into history shows 
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us how Malta reached the almost total dependence on non-renewable power generation and 
thus foreign imports of fossil fuels that it has. [14] 
 
The situation today is very different from what it was decades ago: Renewable technologies 
such as wind and solar have become economically feasible (especially when environmental 
damage due to fossil fuel burning is factored in), and the technologies exist for their 

























III. Establishment of 2020, 20-20-20 Goals 
 
Malta‟s 2004 Accession to the EU 
 
On May 1, 2004 Malta along with nine other countries officially joined the European Union, 
representing the most significant transition for Malta since secession from British rule in 
1964. As a member of the Union it is obliged to meet macro goals and directives as set by the 
EU but it is free to implement the changes in order to meet the objectives as it sees fit at a 
national level. [1] 
 
Result of EU Accession 
Liberalization of Electricity Supply 
In 2001 the Malta Resources Authority (MRA) was established and with its creation, the 
regulatory powers that Enemalta had over the electricity and fuel sectors were removed. 
Instead, under the MRA Act, Enemalta was left to perform its services (generation and 
distribution of electricity and importation and distribution of fuels) on a licensee basis. [7] 
 
With Malta‟s accession to the European Union and in accordance with the EU Electricity 
Directive, Enemalta would no longer hold the legal monopoly powers it had traditionally held 
over electricity generation, thus opening up the possibility of market penetration and 
competition. However, subsequent developments have shown this scenario still to be unlikely. 
In theory the liberalization allows consumers the choice between different suppliers but with 
no competition there is still no choice. To date the fuel market has still not been liberalized.  
Figure 2 on the opposite page displays the European Union as it stood in 2004. The original 
EU-15 Member States (MS) was expanded to 25 nations in the 2004 enlargement to make up 
what is known as the EU-25. Of the candidate states shown on this map Romania and 







Establishment and description of so-called 20-20-20, 2020 Goals 
 
The 20-20-20 2020 goals stem from a long standing discussion within the EU. The EU is a 
major net importer of non-renewable fuels and as such depends on other countries, which may 
not always be the most politically stable approach in terms of the safety of its electricity 
production. In addition, the EU has recognized the fact that non-renewables as their name 
implies are finite. Any resource that has a demand and which over time is depleted, inevitably 
reaches a state at which supply cannot fully satisfy demand. At this state, prices can increase 




dramatically as consumers (and producers) try to outbid one another for desperately needed 
fuel sources.  
Non renewable sources of energy are finite and will eventually deplete; the resulting depletion 
will lead to escalating prices for such energy as the non renewable sources become less 
available. No clear estimate of when exactly the last drop of oil, lump of coal, gallon of 
natural gas will take place; however, predictions vary from as early as 50 years from now to 
300 years [8]. Given the finite nature of non renewable energy it is important to make the 
transition to renewable electrical production as soon as possible. If a last-minute approach is 
adopted, such a sudden transition would put immense strains on the economies of the future as 
consumption from other industries may have to be sacrificed as the development of renewable 
facilities occurs. The construction and eventual decommissioning of renewable energy 
infrastructure is very energy intensive. Therefore, the ideal situation is one in which 
renewable infrastructure is already established so that it can provide a source for the energy 
needed to produce future renewable energy.  
 
Apart from the economic strain that would occur from a delayed transition, the earlier the 
transition toward an energy mix that blends greater amounts of renewable energy, the less 
severe its impact on the environment will be since the scientific community has recognized 
the fact that recent global-climate change has been caused mostly by human activities 
(specifically emissions). [9] 
 
The original proposal for a binding target on renewable energy in the EU was the Renewable 
Energy Directive that was put forward in January 2008. After nearly one year of debating and 
addition of amendments to the original proposal, Member States agreed upon the 2009 EU 
Renewable Energy Directive which put into force mandatory targets for renewable shares for 
each of the Member States. The overall target of the directive is for the EU as a whole to 
reach a total 20 % renewable energy share by the target year of 2020. Because of different 
conditions for each of the Member States (such as installed renewable base, economic status 
and renewable potential) each Member State was assigned its own legally binding target 




Part of the directive is the inclusion of an indicative trajectory which outlines non-binding 
goals that Member States should achieve in the years leading up to 2020. By 2012 states 
should be 20 % of the way towards the target, 30% by 2014; 45 % by 2016; 65 % by 2018; 
100 % by 2020. These targets refer to overall energy consumption, including the transport 
sector. It is expected that renewable sources will provide 35 % of power within the EU for 
electricity generation with wind being the largest contributor, accounting for more than a third 
of total renewable production. [3]  
 
 
Description of so-called 20-20-20, 2020 Goals 
 
The “20-20-20” 2020 goal as outlined in Directive 2009/28/EC of the European Parliament is 
a three pronged action plan that seeks to tackle the problems of global warming, energy 
security, and fossil fuel dependence by increasing renewable share, decreasing greenhouse gas 
emissions, and improving energy efficiency. With this plan, the EU seeks to achieve a total 
energy production from renewable sources of 20 %, carbon emission reduction of 20 % 
(compared to 1990 levels), and reduction in consumption of primary energy by 20 % 
(compared with projected business-as-usual levels) by 2020.  
 
Energy share falls into two categories: Transport Energy and Electrical Energy. The EU seeks 
to achieve a 10 % biofuel share in the transport energy mix by 2020 meaning that the 
renewable energy goals for electrical energy production are on average actually significantly 
higher than 20 %. [4] 
 
 
Specific 2020 Goals Assigned for Malta 
 
When developing the Union wide 20-20-20 goals, the European Union recognized the fact 
that different Member States had very different starting conditions. Some Member States 
(such as Sweden) already had a 20% renewable share while other Member States (such as 
Malta) had less than a 1% renewable share. Also, different member states have different 
strengths of economies and capacity to absorb the interim financial challenges that occurs 
during a transition. In recognition of this fact, the EU assigned different goals for each of its 




Malta was assigned the lowest required share of renewable energy consumption by 2020 of 
10%. The government of Malta has stated that it intends to achieve a 10% target of renewable 
energy in the transport sector through a mix of biofuel and electric vehicle initiatives. This 
leaves the Maltese electricity sector with a goal of 10% renewable energy production by 2020. 
Malta was also assigned one of the lower goals concerning reduction of its CO2 emissions. In 
fact, the goal allows for an increase in CO2 emissions by 2020 of 5% over what they were in 
2005. Emissions of CO2 in 2005 were 2600 Gg (Giga grams). This suggests that Malta must 
have CO2 emissions of less than 2730 Gg in 2020 to meet its goal.  
 
The EU Directive 2006/32/EC which came into effect in 2008 gave Malta an obligation to 








Table 2: Table of EU Climate Guidelines by Member State 
This table shows that goals assigned for Malta are 
significantly lower than most of the other EU countries. [5] 
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Article 4 of the Directive 2009/28/EC on Renewable Energy outlines the requirement that 
Member States submit a National Action Plan (NAP) on a biannual basis in which the 
Member State outlines how it intends to reach its national targets. The plan is to include 
breakdowns of sector projections, efficiency projections and the detailing of plans to meet 
these goals. The European Commission may find that a NAP is inadequate. If this is the case 
then it has the right to consider infringement proceedings against the particular Member State. 
Any significant shortfalls over a two year period during interim trajectory requires that the 







































Chart 2: Renewable Share Trajectory for Malta 
showing the renewable share goal for each 





The Directive specifies that EU Member States have a legal obligation to ensure that 2020 
targets are met. The European Commission can initiate infringement proceedings if a Member 
State does not enact so-called “appropriate measures” in reaching its interim trajectory. The 
results of such infringement proceedings include the need for an issuance of a new national 
action plan to address the previous plan‟s shortcomings and if this new plan is still found as 



























IV. Current Electricity Production Infrastructure 
Non-Renewable 
 
The islands of Gozo and Comino have no permanent generating capacity of their own and are 
interconnected by a single electricity grid to Malta. The main island of Malta is home to the 
two major fossil-fuel power production facilities located at Marsa and Delimara which have a 
total combined nominal installed capacity of 571 MW.  
 
Delimara Power Station 
The total generation capacity of this station is currently 304 MW.  Delimara Power Station 
uses two fuel sources: 1% sulfur fuel oil for the steam units and distillate oil for the gas 




2 x 60MW Conventional Steam Units 1992 
2 x 37MW Open Cycle Gas Turbines 1994 
1 x 110MW Combined-Cycle Plant. 
(Made up of 2 x 37MW Gas Turbines and 1 












Table 3: Power generating infrastructure 
currently installed at Delimara [1] 
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Marsa Power Station 
Total generation capacity of this station is currently 267MW. Marsa Power Station also has 









2 x 10MW Steam Turbines 
2 x 120 Ton/hr Steam Boilers   
2 x 30MW Steam Turbines 1970 
1 x 130 Ton/hr Steam Boilers 1982 
1 x 30MW Steam Turbines 
1 x 130 Ton/hr Steam Boilers 1984 
1 x 30MW Steam Turbines * 
1 x 300 Ton/hr Steam Generator 1985 
1 x 30MW Steam Turbine * 1987 
1 x 60MW Conventional Steam unit* (1996 refurb) 






* Units that were run on coal until 1995 when the practice of coal firing was abolished.  
 
Chart 3 shows the supply of electricity from 2002-2008 by the two power stations. The trend 
has been that Delimara has supplied an increasing share of electric energy over the years from 
45% in 2002 to slightly over 50% in 2008. The Delimara share of electricity generation is 
expected to increase rapidly over the years especially with the mandatory shutdown of Marsa 
expected by the end 2012.  
 
Table 4: Power generating infrastructure 










Overview of Station Statistics 
 
Table 5 shows the breakdown of consumption and efficiency data for the individual power 
production units. As can be seen, the Closed Cycle Gas Turbine (CCGT) unit at Delimara is 
by far the most efficient with an average thermal efficiency between 2007-2008 of 39.16 %.   
 
The fuel consumption data shows that the units at Marsa are being used less while the units at 
Delimara are being used more in preparation for an eventual Marsa shutdown. It is also 
interesting to note that the thermal efficiencies of the units at the Marsa plant have dropped, 
most probably because efficiency improvement and maintenance work is kept to a minimum 
for units which will be discarded in only a few years. The thermal efficiencies of the units at 
Delimara on the other hand, have increased due to the implementation of efficiency 
improvement measures by Enemalta for these units as they are expected to be used for the 




Chart 3: Annual electricity generation by year for 
the two Maltese power production plants: No 
Enemalta annual report is available for 2009-2010, 










Heavy Fuel Oil (Marsa) 389,666 345,708 
Gas Oil (Marsa)     2,316 2,447 
Heavy Fuel Oil (Delimara) 219,755 234,882 
Gas Oil (Delimara) 4,985 2,310 
Gas Oil (Delimara CCGT) 30,852 69,138 
 





Steam Units Marsa 0.308 0.309 
Steam Units Delimara 0.265 0.265 
Gas Turbine Unit Marsa 0.362 0.408 
Gas Turbine Units Delimara 0.356 0.37 
CCGT 0.205 0.203 
 





Steam Units Marsa 26.79 26.76 
Steam Units Delimara 31.62 31.69 
Gas Turbine Unit Marsa 23.06 20.48 
Gas Turbine Units Delimara 23.46 22.57 









 Malta originally forecast in a report to the European Commission (EC) on the implementation 
of EU Directive 2001/77/EC (Promotion of Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources) that 
a realistic target for electricity generated from renewable sources by 2010 should be around 
1.37% with the construction of a large scale wind farm. The original projection was reduced 
to 0.31 %, when in fact a large scale wind farm was not constructed. [4] To date, no large 
scale wind farm has been constructed and Malta has thus missed its high end 2010 estimate. 
Table 5: Fuel Consumption, Fuel Rates, and Station 
Thermal Efficiency data for all power production 
infrastructure in Malta, the current average thermal 
efficiency for power stations in Malta is 28.13%. [3] 
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However, it has surpassed its 0.31 % non wind farm projection with an estimated gross 
renewable energy share in 2009 which was approximately 0.761%. [5] 
 
Currently, photo voltaic (PV) sources have a registered capacity of over 3.5 MW for 
electricity generation; with an operating efficiency of approximately 17.1 % on average this 
brings the supply from total installed PV sources to around 5243 MWh/year. In 2010 Malta 
registered a total electricity production of 2,600 GWh. Therefore the total current supply from 









Chart 4: Malta Photo Voltaic registered installed capacity 








Malta has approximately 15,000 Passive Solar Water Heaters (PSWH) which do not generate 
electricity directly, but their energy savings is registered as a renewable share. Each Passive 
Solar Water Heater creates on average 1500 kWh per year. In total they account for 22,500 
MWh or 22.5 GWh in energy savings per year, thus the current renewable share from PSWH 
is [(22.50/2,600)] = 0.87%. [8] 
 
No  large-scale wind facilities exist in Malta. However, micro wind projects exist such as 
Enemalta‟s experimental micro wind turbine at Vendome rated at 2.5 kW. Bio energy sourced 
from methane generated at the Maghtab landfill is still insignificant but is expected to make 
up an increasingly large share in the years to come. Currently, the renewable share from non-
solar sources is <0.1%. In total, with the addition of these values of 0.87% (PSWH) + 0.2% 
(PV), Malta is estimated to currently have a renewable share of approximately 1.07% of total 
electrical energy produced.  
 
According to the Minister for Rural Affairs and the Environment, George Pullicino, Malta is 
expected to meet its renewable energy generation goal for 2012 of 2% of total share set by the 
European Directive Trajectory. With no major projects expected to be completed in this 
interim period this goal will be achieved mainly by subsidy schemes expanding current photo-
voltaic and passive solar water heater installed capacity. [9]  
Chart 5: Mata Photo Voltaic Installed Capacity breakdown by Sector 





Malta‟s Electrical Distribution Network 
 
Electricity is supplied to the Maltese Islands from the two major power stations at four voltage 
levels of 132 kV, 33 kV, 11 kV and 400/230V operating at an AC (Alternating Current) 
frequency of 50 Hz.  
 
The transmission system is classified into two major rings: 
i. A 132 kV circuit (8 km long) which connects the Delimara Power station directly 
to the 132 kV step-down distribution center located in south Marsa and Mosta 
(pink ring on map of Malta transmission network). The 132 kV is stepped-down at 
these distribution centers to 33 kV where it is in turn transmitted by the 33 kV 
system. 
ii. A 33 kV system which is extensive with up to 4 parallel lines, essentially covering 
the entire islands from Delimara in the South East to Qala in Gozo. It consists of 
both overhead lines (60 km) and underground cables (154 km) and is strategically 
located to be in close proximity to the major population centers of Malta. Eighteen 
Distribution Centers, located strategically throughout the Maltese Islands step-
down the 33kV into 11 kV.   
 
The distribution system is classified into two major rings: 
i. An 11 kV ring that spreads throughout the Maltese Islands and is for the most part 
underground. The 11 kV circuit is by far the most extensive with a total of 1041 
km of underground cable and 159 km of overhead cable. There are a total of 1207 
substations that step down the 11 kV voltage to 400/230V which is the rating at 
which it can safely be transmitted to end-user customers. Some customers (major 
industrial facilities) are supplied directly with electricity rated at 11 kV. 
 
ii. An end-user low voltage system that is rated at 400/230 V with an acceptable 
voltage tolerance of +10 % to – 6 %. This system is three-phase* with four wires 
(with three of the wires for the phases and one for the ground, safety) by far the 
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most extensive and if its total length were to be calculated it would be many times 
the length of the 11 kV system.  
 
*A three-phase system is one in which three conductors carry voltages at waveforms that are 
1/3 of a cycle offset in phase. The result is a balanced, continuous power supply with which 
efficiencies are greater than a conventional single-phase system. [10] [11]   
 
 
Malta Transmission Network is shown on next page Figure 3:
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Malta Energy Breakdown and Projections 
 
Malta is a country that is heavily dependent upon fossil fuel imports due to its lack of 
indigenous fossil fuel resources. The upward trend of fossil fuel imports is expected to 








Malta has no producing energy resources, as a result all non-renewable energy 
consumption comes from imports. Chart 7 shows a breakdown of fuel imports by type 
that are used in the energy sector. Fuel oil and gas oil are the fuel types that are used in 
the electrical sector, meaning that the electricity generation sector accounts for over 2/3 




Chart 6: Malta total annual imports of fossil fuels 
An increase in fossil fuel imports of over 15 % has been 
registered over the last 7 years and the trend is expected 








Chart 8 shows a breakdown of sectors that are responsible for energy consumption in 
Malta. The consumption is rather evenly distributed with each of the three major sectors 
(industrial, commercial and domestic) making up approximately 1/3 of the total 

























Chart 9 is a month by month average for the years from 1992-2003 showing the intra-
annual monthly variations in power generation. These monthly power variations are 
mainly due to the influence of climate and tourism. For example, July and August are 
two of the hottest months (need for air conditioning) in Malta as well as the busiest with 
regard to tourism and reflect this as having the highest power demand; December and 
January are two of the coldest months which have relatively low tourism but have a 




Chart 8: Electrical consumption for Malta- 
breakdown by sector in 2008 [13] 
 
Chart 9: Malta average electricity generated 




The table below highlights the spike in tourism in Malta over the last decade. In 1992, 
17% less electricity was produced in July than was produced in February; however, in 
2003, 19% more electricity was produced in July than was produced in February. With 
no major change in climate, it is possible to attribute these numbers predominately to 
the increased influx of tourists that occur in summer months as well as the surge in air 



































Total Power Generated (MWh) in Malta (1990-2006)
Table 6: Enemalta, historical average 
electricity generated by month [14] 
 
Chart 10: Historical power generated (MWh) in Malta for the 





Forecasting power generation to 2020, a linear fit gave best extrapolation correlation 
with an R
2
 value of 0.983 indicating a 98.3% fit to the 1990-2006 data. With this fit it is 
projected that Malta will have to produce a total of 3,250,000 MWh to satisfy the 
Island‟s need for electricity.  Note: this factors in “electricity losses” which are at nearly 
14% of total; these losses are expected to be reduced with the coming installation of the 
Smart Meter System which is projected to eliminate theft from meters from the system. 
Furthermore transmission grid improvements are expected to greatly reduce electricity 
lost in transmission due to genuine power losses. 
 
Malta Resources Authority (MRA) and Enemalta projections (Chart 11 and Table 7) of 
a “business as usual attitude” (where transmission and consumer end efficiency 














However, the years between 1990 and 2000 represented a period of unprecedented 
population and economic growth for the Maltese Islands, therefore, such a fit will be 
biased towards the earlier years‟ growth. Extrapolation of demographic data suggests 
that population growth will not be nearly as great as the previous period and therefore 
the next fit makes use of data from 2004 onward only. 2004 was a year in which 
Maltese consumers experienced several electricity price spikes and a change in the 
billing system which rewards lower consumption. The result of these price “shocks” 
was that demand slowed drastically.  









With this dataset, a linear fit is the best forecast with a 99.78% correlation. 
Extrapolating to 2020 it is forecast that Malta will have to generate 2,580,000 MWh of 
electricity in order to satisfy demand. A situation such as this will only occur if energy 
efficiency improvements are made on a scale that the EU requires for Malta‟s 2020 
targets and, as a result of the new price structure, consumers continue to be wary of high 
consumption.  
 
In 1991 the average price of electricity for households was 21% cheaper than for 
industrial users. By contrast in 2006 the average price of electricity for households was 
27% more expensive. In other words, this represents a change in government policies 
with regard to which sectors they preferred to subsidize. There has been an almost 50% 
increase of household prices versus industrial electricity prices with the result that 
residential consumers are more burdened with higher electricity prices to support the 
lower electricity prices enjoyed by industry.  
Total Power Generated (MWh) in Malta (1990-2006)





























Chart 12:  Forecasting Malta power demand based upon last three years of 
available data (a trajectory factoring in efficiency improvements) 








The energy intensity of the economy is an indicator of how energy efficient a nation‟s 
economy is. Thus, a very energy intensive economy requires a large amount of unit 
energy in order to produce a unit money of economic production. Lower energy 
intensity values represent economies that are more efficient or can also represent 
economies which have shifted from an energy intensive manufacturing and agriculture 
economy to a less energy intensive consumer and services economy.  
 
The table below indicates that Malta has a highly energy intensive economy as shown in 
figures of energy intensity that are almost 50% over the EU 25 average in 2004.  
Table 8: Average electricity prices for industry 
and households 1991 – 2006 from Eurostat EC 








As can be seen on the chart below, Malta had an energy intensity of 300 kgoe / 1000 
Euro in 2004 which is the same as it was in 1991.  By contrast, the EU-15 had an energy 
intensity of 220 in 1991 which is now down to 180, following a linear downtrend. The 
indication is that the rest of Europe‟s economies have done more to improve their 
energy efficiencies over the last decade than Malta has done. 
Table 9: Energy intensity of the economy for 1993 – 2004 (last 





























Chart 13: Graphical comparison of energy intensity of Malta‟s 




V. Problems with Current Electricity Production 
 
Effective Monopoly of Production 
 
As discussed earlier, with Malta‟s accession to the European Union in 2004, the Malta 
electric energy market became liberalized. This market liberalization gives the right for 
other companies to compete in the Maltese energy market. However, with no electrical 
interconnection and a heavily entrenched market presence of the only producer 
(Enemalta) coupled with a small island state economy, it does not make economic sense 
for any other power company to try to establish a presence in Malta and compete in the 
energy market. 
 
The problem with an effective monopoly, as has been proven time and time again 
throughout history, is that there is no incentive for improvement of quality and 
efficiency. A company with a monopoly has no need to improve its products as it has no 
competitor offering any alternative. The result in almost every case of market monopoly 




 October, 2010 Enemalta was featured on the Times of Malta front page 
headline: “Enemalta, WSC, buses top list of complaints”.  The index was based upon 
a European Commission survey the purpose of which was to identify markets that may 
be underperforming for consumers.  
       “The most recent EU survey released earlier this week in which the   
         over whelming majority of Maltese identified the electricity sector as 
         the most problematic the Island is facing due to lack of competition.”   
         Ivan Camilleri, Brussels, Times of Malta, 23
rd
 October 2010, page 1.  
 
 As will be discussed later, the Malta-Sicily interconnection may change this 
monopolistic dynamic. 
 
Pseudo Private-Public Corporation 
 
Enemalta “Corporation” exists as an independent entity in the sense that it should be 
responsible for managing itself in a way that makes the most business sense. Enemalta 
is not traded on the Malta Stock Exchange and the only equity holder in the company is 
42 
 
the Government of Malta. This close link between Government and the Corporation 
means that the Government ultimately dictates company policies with regard to projects 
of large operational significance. Government decisions can often be politically 
motivated and do not always represent the best interests of the Country, but rather the 
best interests of the ruling political party, with the consequence that less than ideal 
decisions are sometimes made.  
 
 Eng. Charles Yousif observed in his work on Malta‟s Energy policy: 
          “Malta‟s concerned actors partly neglect the place but act according to  
          personal motivation, perception and capacities…both the EU RE policy   
          framework and the national interaction process influence the   
          implementation process, which can lead to spatial mismatches.” 
„Spatial misfits in a multi-level renewable energy policy implementation process on the 
Small Island State of Malta’. Kotzebue, Bressers, Yousif , University of Malta 2010.   





Debt is a major burden on any company as it hinders the ability of a company to operate 
and develop effectively since capital and timeframe of investment are restricted to short-
sighted results that relieve the burden of debt. 
   
Due to Enemalta‟s monopolistic status, its financial status and health essentially 
represent the overall viability of Malta‟s power production. This is crucial as to why an 
analysis of Enemalta‟s financial health and how it has performed historically is 
important since it is possible to deduce forward looking trends on the Company‟s 
sustainability and thus the energy market of Malta.  For the purpose of analysis the 
latest financial statement available from Enemalta was used which is for 2007.  Emails 
sent to Enemalta asking where the subsequent financial statements could be found were 
unanswered. 
  
The graph below is a plot of cumulative year by year losses incurred by Enemalta dating 
back to 2000. The Company suffered its greatest losses in 2008 and 2009 [2] when oil 
prices spiked to record levels and consumer prices were not raised sufficiently in order 
to compensate for the spikes in oil prices. In order for Enemalta to raise prices that 
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Maltese consumers pay for electricity, it must first obtain permission from the Prime 
Minister who is often very hesitant to permit any price hikes due to the unpopularity of 
such actions. A predictive down-trending exponential relationship fits the dataset most 
closely with a correlation factor of over 92%.  
 
Since 2000, Enemalta has lost almost 90 million Euros and is expected to continue to 








Enemalta Financial Reports 2000-2007:  for the results of those years, the last available 
financial report is from 2007, therefore, information for 2008 and 2009 losses were 
taken from Maltese Minister Austin Gatt‟s presentation as shown in Parliament and as 




Chart 14: Cumulative year by year net loss of Enemalta 
showing an unsustainable downward financial trend [1] [2] 
Shown in Maltese Liri, (Euro/Lire conversion 2.42 Euro/Lire) 
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The chart below shows a plot of the price of crude oil with the cumulative losses of 
Enemalta since 2000 reflecting a very high inverse correlation between crude oil prices 






The chart below is a plot of the profits for of the three divisions within Enemalta 
(Electricity, Petroleum, Gas Divisions) over the years. The Petroleum Division has been 
profitable historically, while the Electricity Division has been responsible for the bulk 
of the company losses. Losses in the Electricity Division are mainly offset by the 
Petroleum Division which has continued to be profitable. However, when operational 
costs are coupled with cumulative division profits one obtains the serial downtrend 
displayed on Chart 14. 





























Price of Crude Oil (nominal $) Enemalta Cumulative Profit (Liri*1,000,000)
Chart 15: Enemalta profits as plotted against the 








Liquid value of the company, as plotted in the chart below, is obtained by taking total 
current assets and subtracting them from total liabilities. The result is the liquid value of 
the company, i.e. the amount of funds that it can easily access and use. The implication 
of the down-trending graph located below on Chart 17 is that the company is becoming 
increasingly insolvent, further hindering its ability to operate successfully.  
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Losses in Distribution (Technical and Theft): 
 
Among the 27 European countries Malta has the second highest power losses (behind 
Lithuania only) as a percentage of energy produced with over 13% transmission and 
distribution losses. Losses in transmission and distribution have been identified as a 
major problem for which there is significant room for improvement. Distribution losses 
of electrical energy will be discussed in detail in the next section as they are extremely 
significant.   
 
 
Old Inefficient Power Production Facilities (Marsa): 
The Large Combustion Plant Directive 2001/80/EC is applicable to all EU Member 
States. In order to prevent unacceptable environmental damage and harm to human 
health (cancer, asthma and bronchitis), the directive seeks to close down power stations 
that are deemed inefficient, which have emissions above those outlined as acceptable 
within the Directive. [4] The Directive specifies that power stations that do not meet the 
required emission standards have to either install appropriate pollution control 
equipment or close down once they have reached 20,000 hours of use.  
 
Unfortunately, Marsa Power Station falls under the list of power plants which must be 
























allocated operational hours [5] and current projections predict that the Plant will reach 
the 20,000 hour limit by the end of 2012. [6]  
 
Several localities are being negatively affected by emissions from the Marsa Power 
Plant which lies within one of Malta‟s largest cities of Marsa and is within kilometers of 
many of Malta‟s largest urban centers. Neighboring areas of Floriana, Hamrun, Qormi, 
Paola as well as Marsa have all been described as being negatively affected by 
unacceptable emissions from Marsa. [7]   The health ramifications can be seen when 
comparing the Regions of Malta; the South Eastern Region and Southern Harbour 
Regions of Malta have a significant health factor differential from other areas of 
Malta/Gozo. [Appendix D1A1] 
 
In order to minimize the operational hours that Marsa uses, Enemalta has been operating 
units at Delimara at full capacity and uses Marsa as backup in order to handle load 
fluctuations. This load cycling has also indirectly resulted in the most efficient machines 
being used which has served to reduce the overall amount of CO2 produced. [8] 
 
With a high incidence of asthma and bronchial disease in the surrounding area that is 
often attributed to the nearby power station, it is imperative that Malta close down the 





The table below lists the amount of CO2 emissions per kWh of electricity generated. 
Malta has by far the highest CO2 emissions for each kWh of electricity that is generated 
as compared with the other Member States analyzed. The significance of these figures is 
that they suggest that the power generation facilities in Malta lack efficiency when 
compared with the three other EU Member States shown in the table. Given that the 
three other countries use similar fundamental technologies for non-renewable energy 
production (combustion technology), then these figures show a direct correlation to 
efficiency of power generation. These significant differences in efficiency mean that a 
power station in Malta will have to use more fuel for each given kWh produced, 
resulting in a much higher cost of electrical production. In addition to a higher cost, 
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other harmful gases (such as N2O) will be emitted at a higher level resulting in other 
public health complications.    
The matter of N2O and dust particulate emissions is of a particular concern to Malta as 
Delimara and Marsa are located within highly urbanized areas and any emissions will 
cause a high proximate effect on the air quality of the surrounding regions. In Malta, the 
prevailing winds blow in a south-easterly direction; with Delimara on the South-Eastern 
tip on the Island the impact of emissions from the station on the rest of the Island is 
diminished. However Marsa is much more central and prevailing south-easterly winds 
pose a problem for urbanized areas (such as Tarxien, Zejtun, Zabbar and Qormi) that lie 
in the path of this trajectory. The prevailing wind is not always sustained and when 
variable winds occur then poor quality air can be blown in any direction, especially 
consequential to the most populated Northern parts of the Island.  
 
Average Emissions in kgCO2/kWh for Traditional Generation.   
Malta [8]. Italy [10]. Spain [10]. UK [11]. 





Table 10: Comparative emissions of CO2 per unit power (cleanliness of 







Figure 4 displays SO2 emissions by volume recorded around Malta and Gozo; the area 
around Marsa has by far the highest levels of SO2 (a precursor to acid rain and 























Energy Shortfall (if Marsa Power Station is closed in 2012): 
 
Delimara currently has a power generation capacity of 304 MW; with the addition of the 
144 MW extension which is expected to be completed by 2011, it would bring Delimara 
up to a total capacity of 448 MW. As discussed earlier, the 267 MW station at Marsa 
has a finite number of hours (20,000) to run before it will be required to close or face 
fines. With over half these hours already expended, at current rates of consumption it is 
predicted that the station will exceed the 20,000 hours by late 2012 and face closure. 
Chart 18: N2O emissions in Malta by sector, Key:  Red represents 
Energy Industries, Green represents Transportation Yellow 
represents Commercial, Institutional, Residential  [13] 
 
Chart 19: CO2 emissions in Malta by sector, Key:  Red 
represents Energy Industries, Blue represents Manufacturing 
Industries, Green represents Transportation, Yellow 




The consequence of such a closure can be predicted by using historical peak load 
demand and forecasting into the future.  
 
Peak load refers to the maximum amount of electrical demand experienced by a grid. 
The Maltese grid has no control over individual consumer consumption and thus must 
keep electrical production capacity over consumption at all times. In the event of a 
major technical fault (such as boiler failure) which causes production to be 
unexpectedly and suddenly dropped, then it can lead to a nation-wide blackout. So far in 
2010, there have been two nation-wide blackouts that have been responsible for millions 
of Euros in economic damage. [14] Due to the consequence of blackouts it is essential 
to have a production capacity that is reliable and is capable of consistently producing 
electricity over projected peak demand.  
 
Chart 20 below, illustrates that Malta has historically experienced peak load demand 
during the winter period. However, with the rapid growth in the tourism industry (which 
is mainly active during summer) as well as an increase in installation of air conditioning 










The chart below shows the maximum peak load for each year and projections to 2020. 
A good linear correlation was obtained which fit the data at a 92% confidence factor 
and this can be used to predict future peak loads. Peak load in 2012 is expected to be 
480 MW while peak load in 2020 is expected to be 560 MW. The forecast  2012 peak 
load is higher than Delimara‟s capacity (including extension) which means that 
additional power generation capacity must be installed before Marsa can be shut down. 
The solution to this additional load demand is the installation of the 200 MW Sicily – 
Malta interconnection. Such an interconnection must be installed and operational well 
before Marsa is forced to shut down, before it has used up its allocated 20,000 
operational hours in order to allow for a smooth transition of power generation. 
 
 







Delimara with extension (448 MW) and Malta-Sicily interconnection (200 MW) would 
give the Island a total capacity of 648 MW. The contribution from renewable sources 
with regard to capacity is more difficult to calculate as it can fluctuate dramatically from 
sub 10% to values over 40%.  
 
With an average hourly production of 371 MW projected for 2020, if it is assumed  that 
Malta will reach its goals of 10% renewable share by then, it will require that 37.1 
MW/hr average will be provided from renewable sources. This would increase effective 
total island capacity to (648 + 37.1 ) 685.1 MW. However, power contribution from 
renewable sources can fluctuate dramatically on an hourly, daily or monthly basis. For 
example, wind speeds can be low enough to cause a wind farm to produce at less than 
10% of capacity and incident sunlight at night time can reach effective zero values 
causing solar production to generate at 0% of capacity. Therefore, one must be careful 
when considering installed renewable energy base as capacity since, if peak load 
occurred at a worst case scenario (late afternoon, low winds), then renewable 
contribution as a percentage of its efficiency could be 10% or less. With efficiency 




factors on average of 25% then this will result in an effective installed renewable base 
of 14.8 MW.  
 
If a worst case renewable production scenario (10% efficiency) is considered for the 
occurrence of peak load, then at the time the Island would have an effective total 
capacity of 662.8 MW (14.8 + 648).  
 
With peak load forecast to be over 560 MW by 2020, the gap between generation 
capacity and peak load would be only 102.8 MW (662.8 – 560 or 15.5%) which would 
leave no room for machine failure. It is an accepted rule in power production that a 
country should have capacity well over peak load (over 20%) and enough back up 
systems such that it can afford the failure of one system without plunging the entire  
grid into black out.  
 
If for any reason there is a failure of the interconnection or of  the Delimara extension at 
these projected times of peak load demand then supply would plunge below demand 
and result in a nation wide blackout. With the increased demand projected by 2020, the 
extension and interconnection by themselves are not adequate when the importance of 
energy security and reliability is factored in. This indicates that Malta will have to 
consider another option (in the range of 140 – 200 MW) to bolster its power production 
capacity by 2020.  
 
There is very little reason to achieve the 20-20-20 goals if by 2020 the power capacity 
situation is not adequate, resulting in a system prone to blackouts during peak load 
situations. Malta has two options in order to bolster its reliable energy capacity: 
boosting local production capacity or increasing capacity via the installation of an 
additional interconnection. If the Delimara extension is considered as a model example 
for the bolstering of local energy capacity then this can be compared to the installation 








VI. How Should the 2020 Goals be Achieved? 
With the bankruptcy of the US Investment banking firm Lehman Brothers in September 
of 2008, the world financial system was on the precipice of collapse, and was only 
saved (albeit temporary) by the extraordinary „quantitative easing‟ measures taken by 
the central banks of the major countries. The EU was forced to set up a guarantee 
package of close to a trillion Euros in order to save some Member States from sovereign 
debt default in 2010. The viability of these measures is still in doubt, and the outcome 
will seriously affect the ability of Malta to finance the projects envisioned in this 
dissertation. It is well beyond the scope of this dissertation to predict the future 
availability and cost of money which hinges on this outcome. This dissertation therefore 
addresses each analysis with respect to the economics, the environmental impact, and 
the sociological impact of the projects considered in a normal, non-crisis setting. 
 
2020 Scenarios (Analysis of Economic & Environmental consequences) 
 
Four comparison studies in order of importance to reach 2020 targets: 
 
1. Power Losses in Electrical Transmission and Distribution Systems 
Transmission and Distribution Losses in General: 
Electric power systems are typically composed of an electric power generating facility 
connected to a transmission system which then connects to a distribution system which 
supplies power to the end user. The power supplied to the transmission system is net of 
the power used by the generating facility itself. The transmission system transmits 
power at high voltage (usually >100,000 Volts AC) at distances up to thousands of 
kilometers. For shorter distances (<50 kilometers) lower voltages are used (for example, 
32,000 Volts AC). The voltage is then stepped down (to 100-400 volts AC) for use in a 
distribution system which distributes to many end user customers. Transmission and 
distribution power losses (TPL) in general represents the discrepancy between the 
energy produced by the utility (Eg) the net of self consumption (Ec) and the energy sold 
to end user customers (Es) and is represented as: 
TPL = Eg –Ec –Es  (1) 
From equation 1 above the total energy either lost or self consumed by the producer in a 
system (TPL + Ec) is then: 
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TPL + Ec = Eg -  Es 
Transmission and distribution power losses as a percent (TPL%) of that which is 
transmitted from the power station (Eg-Ec) is then: 
TPL% = [TPL/(Eg-Ec)]*100  (2) 
In the USA in 2007, national-level TPL% losses were 6.5% of total electricity 
disposition excluding direct use: [1] 
 
Table 11 
Transmission and Distribution Power Losses (2000) by Region in Percent, [2] 
 
 Region  # of Countries TPL % 
Western Europe  17      7.56 
Eastern Europe  24  18.18 
Middle-east, North Africa 11  19.63 
Africa    11  19.55 
North America    3      9.38 
South America    9  17.23 
Central America, Caribbean   9  21.68 
South Asia     5  27.55 
Southeast Asia    7  12.14 
East Asia, Australia    6      7.65 
 
                Total   102     Mean 16.22 
 
Comparing the TPL% of a reasonably efficient and well regulated country such as the 
USA to the TPL% of countries around the world, and because TPL is taken right off of 
the top of the utility‟s turnover, TPL can represent a very significant worldwide 
indicator. For example, the average of 27.55 TPL% for South Asia is 323% higher than 
the 6.5 TPL% for the U.S. The spectrum of worldwide TPL losses vary widely, from a 
small, efficient system with negligible pilferage such as Luxembourg where the TPL% 
is 1.42% (Table 13) to a very large, inefficient system with large endemic pilferage such 
as has been reported in India‟s capital city of Delhi with a TPL% of 42%. [3] 
 
The amount of power lost in a system has a very significant effect on the billing tariff to 
the customer. In order for the utility to pay its expenses and make a reasonable return on   
investment, the customers must pay for all of the power generated regardless of how 
much is lost. In order to simplify and make more relevant to this topic we will only 
consider losses from the point of transmission from the power station. Let us assume 
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that the proper billing rate for a utility operating with no energy losses is Bo in Euros 
per kWh. Then the new billing rate Bn for that utility in order to receive the same 
income as before with a loss percent rate of TPL% is: 
Bn = Bo*[100/(100-TPL%)]  (3) 
The percent increase in the billing rate (Br%) is: 
Br% = [(Bn-Bo)/Bo]*100  (4) 
Substituting for Bn from equation 3 into equation 4 we have Br% as a function of 
TPL% : 
Br% = {[100/(100-TPL%)]-1}*100  (5) 


































Increase in Billing Rate % vs Power Loss (TPL%)
 
 
As can be seen in Chart 22, the slope of the curve increases as TPL% increases, such 
that a 30% energy loss rate produces a 43% increase in the billing rate.  
In the EU, TPL%‟s vary significantly from the 3.45% of a country such as Finland with 
a very efficient system and a low amount of pilferage to the 12.29% of a country such as 
Bulgaria with an inefficient system and a high rate of pilferage: [Table 13] 
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Transmission and Distribution Power Losses are the sum of two types of power 
loss- Technical (TTPL) and non-Technical (NTTPL): 
 
TPL% = TTPL% + NTTPL%   (6) 
 
Technical Transmission and Distribution Power Losses (TTPL) are power losses 
caused by technical factors such as: Resistive heat losses in transmission and 
distribution lines, transformers, and other equipment due to electrical resistance; 
magnetic losses, where energy dissipates into a magnetic field; and the dielectric effect, 
where energy is absorbed in the insulating material.  In alternating current circuits, the 
inductance and capacitance of the phase conductors can be significant. This causes 
reactive currents which cause additional losses in the transmission circuits. TTPL can be 
reduced and optimized by installing capacitors in key areas in order to improve the 
power factor, transmission lines can be upgraded to a higher voltage in order to reduce 
resistive heat losses, and more efficient transformers and other equipment can be 
installed. In AC transmission systems efficiency can be improved by using transformers 
to step up the voltage for transmission and then using transformers to step down the 
voltage for final distribution to the end users. This reduces the electrical current in the 
transmission conductors while keeping the power transmitted nearly equal to the power 
input. According to Joule‟s Law (Q = I
2
*R*t) the energy losses are proportional to the 
square of the current; reducing the current by a factor of two will lower energy lost to 
conductive resistance by a factor of four. Long distance transmission (thousands of 
kilometers) of electricity can be cheap and efficient. In the U.S. costs are US$0.005-
0.02/kWh. [4] It is impossible to eliminate all TTPL, however by the use of efficiently 
designed systems and with equipment of high efficiency the losses can be minimized.  
 
Non-Technical Transmission and Distribution Power Losses (NTTPL) are all 
transmission and distribution losses which are not TTPL. The largest component of 
NTTPL is pilferage. [5] The theft of electric power is a loss right off the top of the 
revenue stream of the power company such that even a 1% theft loss, which is very low, 
results in a serious bottom line loss. For example if the power company had profits of 
5% of turnover, then even a 1% theft loss would cause a 20% profit loss and a 5% theft 
loss would cause a 100% profit loss. Because of this leverage onto the bottom line, 
those power companies that are privatized have put great effort into reducing theft 
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losses. In the past, before the big push to privatize when the power companies were 
owned and operated by governments, theft was hushed up and swept under the rug in 
order to satisfy political aims.  
 
As explained previously, NTTPL% losses vary widely worldwide from less than 1%, up 
to 42%. Typically, power companies are allowed as per a regulatory framework to earn 
a certain return on investment (ROI). This means that it is the bill paying consumers 
who pay for all of the theft, which means that tariffs in countries such as India are very 
high, which leads to more theft.  
Therefore electric power theft and tariffs are a positive feedback system. 
 
Electric Power Losses for Malta: 
Transmission and Distribution Power Losses (TPL) for Malta: 
For Malta the following data were collected from the annual report for Enemalta [6] for 
the fiscal year 2006/7 (the last published annual report) showing the electricity 
generated, transmitted and distributed in kWh: 
 
Table 12 
      Electricity Produced (kWh) by Destination 
 
Used in station     132,646 
Industrial      650,542 
Domestic      645,040 
Commercial      529,593 
Street Lighting          28,796 
Lost in Distribution and Unaccounted for  279,486 
                   Total   2,266,103 
 
With reference to Table 12 above, TPL% for Enemalta for fiscal year 2006/7 (the last 
published annual report) using formula 2 is then: 
TPL% (Enemalta) = [279,486/(2,266,103-132,646)]*100 
     = 13.1% 
 
This suggests that Enemalta's TPL% is 101.5 % more than the 6.5% average for the 
USA as stated above and is 71.2% more than the Western European average of 7.61% 




Electric Power Transmission and Distribution Losses for the EU countries: 
Electric power transmission and distribution losses include losses in transmission 
between sources of supply and points of distribution and in the distribution to 
consumers, including pilferage. The TPL% for the EU countries for 2004 is shown as a 
































27 Latvia 18.90  



















































TPL% vs Country Rank
 
Latvia (27) is the only outlier. The mean value as calculated is 7.64, and correlates well 
with the Western European figure of 7.56 in Table 11. The TPL% of 13.13% for Malta 
in Table 13 above correlates well with the TPL% (Enemalta) of 13.1% as calculated 
from the Enemalta annual report data shown in Table 12. Malta is ranked 26 out of 27 
EU countries and is 72% higher than the mean. Malta has a land area of 316 km
2 
[Appendix A2] and is the smallest country in the EU. The next smallest EU countries 
are Cyprus and Luxembourg with land areas of 9251 km
2
 and 2586 km
2
 respectively. 
Malta‟s very short transmission distances should allow Malta to have a lower TPL% 
than Cyprus or Luxembourg. Malta‟s TPL% is however 835% higher than Luxembourg 
and 189% higher than Cyprus. 
 
Using the turnover projections from Appendix B, Table B1; Table 14 is constructed as 
shown below. The TPL losses in Euros are projected to 2020 using the present TPL% 
loss rate for Malta of 13.1%, as compared to the TPL losses for Mata if it had the TPL% 








Year €  1000's 13.1 Cum 4.55 Cum Difference Cum
2010 240,084 (31,451) (31,451) (10,924) (10,924) (20,527) (20,527)
2011 254,211 (33,302) (64,753) (11,567) (22,490) (21,735) (42,262)
2012 268,338 (35,152) (99,905) (12,209) (34,700) (22,943) (65,205)
2013 282,465 (37,003) (136,908) (12,852) (47,552) (24,151) (89,356)
2014 296,592 (38,854) (175,761) (13,495) (61,047) (25,359) (114,714)
2015 310,719 (40,704) (216,466) (14,138) (75,185) (26,566) (141,281)
2016 324,846 (42,555) (259,020) (14,780) (89,965) (27,774) (169,055)
2017 338,973 (44,405) (303,426) (15,423) (105,388) (28,982) (198,037)
2018 353,100 (46,256) (349,682) (16,066) (121,454) (30,190) (228,228)
2019 367,227 (48,107) (397,789) (16,709) (138,163) (31,398) (259,625)
2020 381,354 (49,957) (447,746) (17,352) (155,515) (32,606) (292,231)






































The undiscounted excess cumulative loss difference is €292,231,000 as per Table 14 
and Chart 24. The blue squares are the TPL losses at 13.1% (Malta), and the red squares 
are the losses at 4.55% (Cyprus). 
 
Malta therefore has the combination of a technically inefficient power transmission 
and distribution system and a high rate of pilferage (see Table 16 and [9]) 
compared to similarly situated EU countries. 
 
Technical Transmission and Distribution Power Losses (TTPL) for Malta: 
The Ministry for Resources and Rural Affairs report [8] has projected future increased 
efficiency in the transmission and distribution system, and less losses due to self 
consumption as per the following Table 15: 
 
Table 15 
                                             Forecasted TTPL for Malta 
 











2020 3.83 4.0  
 
Enemalta is planning by the use of improvements and upgrades to decrease self 
consumption by 30% and to decrease TTPL by 20% over the next 10 years. Applying 
these projected percentages to the projected Electrical Division turnover from Appendix 
B, Table 1, results in gross, undiscounted savings over the 10 year period (2011-2020) 





All possible technical upgrades should be implemented where it can be shown that 
the discounted present value of the benefit is significantly greater than the present 
cost of the improvement. 
 
Non Technical Transmission and Distribution Power Losses (NTTPL) for Malta: 
Pursuant to their annual reports [6] Enemalta has conducted surprise inspections at 
randomly selected sites. The data is summarized in table 16 below: 
 
     Table 16 
                        Compilation of Enemalta inspection results 
       Inspection Year    Sites Inspected    # of Tampered Meters    %Tampered 
     2007     12,668      585       4.6 
     2006     10,198      500       4.9 
     2005       8,000      305       3.8 
 
These randomly selected, surprise inspections disclosed and brought to light close to a 
5% tamper rate. No mention is made in the Enemalta annual reports concerning the 
detection of pre meter mains tap-ins, or underbilling due to meters that have not been 
read due to malfeasance by meter readers. 
 
The Malta Sunday Times on November 13, 2008 in an article by Caroline Muscat and 
Herman Grech [9] stated a 13% TPL% for 2008, with a TTPL% of 6%, and a NTTPL% 
of 7%; these figures were confirmed by three independent analysts. From the 2008 
Enemalta annual report the turnover for the Electricity Division was €202,607,000 and 
the operating profit was €7,386,100. The loss, using the 7% NTTPL% in Euro terms, 
was €15,249,850, which is approximately 200% of the operating profit. This means that 
if the NTTPL could be eliminated, the cost of electricity to Enemalta‟s paying 
customers could be reduced by 8.56% (see Table 17). 
 
The total energy lost in a system is the sum of the energy consumed at the generating 
plant plus TTPL plus NTTPL. However, in order to make the following analysis 
relevant to just transmission and distribution, we consider only losses from the point of 
transmission from the power station. We assume then that the paying customers pay for 




Br% = {[100/(100-TTPL%-NTTPL%)]-1}*100    (7) 
 
Using the value for TTPL% of 6% from above, we then have the increase in the billing 
rate as a function of NTTPL% with TTPL% held constant: 
 
Br% = {[100/(94-NTTPL%)]-1}*100 (8) 
 
The values of Br% were then computed for NTTPL% from 0% to 10% and are shown 
below in Table 17, column 1. Listed in column 2 as displayed in Chart 25 are the 
increases in Br% caused by NTTPL% less the constant Br% caused by TTPL% = 6% 
which can be seen to be 6.38% in column 1: 
 
     Table 17 









































Bill % Increase as a Function of NTTPL%
 
The 7% NTTPL% rate in Malta then produces a 8.56% increase in the billings for 
all of the bill paying Maltese vs. if there were no NTTPL. 
 
Because of the significant size of the NTTPL problem for Enemalta, it would be prudent 
to spend appropriate sums to reduce or extinguish the problem. There are four basic 
methods for dealing with theft and fraud: 
 
Methods for Dealing with Theft and Fraud 
 
i. Investigation and Surveillance: 
Based upon an hourly wage of  €10 and estimating the inspection process with a 
duration of five hours, the cost of each inspection is approximately €50.  Using the cost 
of inspecting each meter and  cost of each tampered meter at €1000 per year, then the 
benefit of the inspections to Enemalta is estimated at: 
 
Cost of inspections- 10,000*€50 = €500,000 
Value of saving = net present value of €1000 for 10 years at 5% interest rate: 
NPV= €7,722 
Using 500 (5 %) tampered meters per 10,000 inspections: 
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 = €7,722*500 
= €3,861,000 
Profit from each 10,000 inspections = €3,861,000 -€500,000 
              = €3,361,000 
 
If these assumptions are close to reality then it is imperative that this profit 
potential be harvested by greatly increasing the number of inspections. 
 
ii. Technical Methods:  
The installation of new smart meters will not only eliminate meter tampering which is 
quite easy with the present electro-mechanical meters [9], but will also provide real time 
information in order to implement real time energy balance and expedite the integration 
of all billing and accounting functions. Algorithms will be used to detect illegal loads 
almost immediately and narrow the investigation to just one user. A great deal of effort 
is presently being undertaken by utilities worldwide to detect theft and fraud in energy 
systems through the use of Artificial Neural Networks, Support Vector Machines, and 
other computer systems [10]. The elimination of meter tampering is a big step, but it 
does not solve the problem of tapping into the mains before the meter. The computer 
oriented systems mentioned above will hopefully help in this regard. It will be very 
difficult to detect theft when the mains are already tapped into in order to provide free 
energy for only part of a user‟s needs leaving the rest on the meter. It must be 
anticipated that smart thieves will obtain information concerning the detection 
algorithms and will design their theft accordingly.  
 
The Smart Grid is estimated to cost €71,000,000 [11]. The following is an estimate of 
the value of this system from the standpoint of the meter theft savings alone. We assume 
that the Smart System will reduce meter theft from 5% to 1%, and that the total gross 
revenue stream to the Electric Division of Enemalta is € 3,417,909,000 over the 11 year 
period 2010-2020 (from Table B1 Appendix B). The gross undiscounted savings due to 
the reduction in meter theft over the 11 year period is then € 136,716,000. The 
discounted net present value of the 4% savings stream at a 6% use of money rate is 
€95,445,000. This means that the entire cost of the Smart Grid can be recaptured 






iii. Honesty and Transparency in Governance and Human Development: 
Most thieves in some way excuse their actions. The most common being that if they see 
nepotism, graft and corruption at the top of the political structure, then “if they are 
doing it why not me?” 
  
Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI) vs. Transmission and Distribution Power 
Losses (TPL%): 
 
Transparency International is a well respected organization that rates 180 countries of 
the world with a Corruptions Perceptions Index (CPI). This CPI indicates the perceived 
level of public-sector corruption in a country/territory. The CPI is based on 13 
independent surveys. The data for all EU countries was constructed from the worldwide 































27 Romania 3.8      
Mean    6.36  Median   6.6 






































Corruptions Perceptions Index vs Country Rank
 
 
In table 18 above, Malta is ranked 13 out of 19 (not 27 because of ties), with Denmark 
at the top (least corruption), and Romania at the bottom (most corruption). The data is 
smooth with no outliers. Using an Excel spread sheet the correlation coefficient between 
the CPI data in Table 18 and the TPL% data from Table 13 for the 27 EU countries is 
calculated to be r = -0.577.  The t is then computed using the formula: 
 t = r/(sqrt[(1-r
2
)/(N-2)]) = -3.53 
The non-directional probability of the null hypothesis is then 0.00163. This indicates a 














    Malta: red 
 
With reference to Chart 27 above, the linear trendline equation is:  
TPL% = -1.1848*CPI+15.165. If Malta were on trendline with its present CPI of 5.2, it 
would have a TPL% of 9.0%. With a present turnover of €240,084,000/annum 
[Appendix B] this would result in an annual savings of  €(13.1-9.0)*240,084,000/100 =  
€9,843,444. If Malta could increase its CPI to 7.0 and stay on trendline, this would 
result in reducing its TPL% to 6.87%, which would result in an additional annual 
savings of €(9.0-6.87)*240,084,000/100 = €5,113,789. If Malta could both increase its 
CPI to 7.0 and stay on trendline, there would result total annual savings of €14,957,233. 
 
Human Development Index (HDI) vs. Transmission and Distribution Power Losses 
(TPL%): 
The United Nations Development Programme publishes the Human Development Index 
(HDI) which is a measure of the average achievements of a country in three basic 
dimensions of human development: a long and healthy life, knowledge and a decent 
standard of living. [13] The data for the EU countries are taken from a list of 182 
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countries calculated in 2007, and is shown in the Table 19 below together with a 




























27 Romania 0.837     
Mean   0.921     Median    0.9 
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Human Development Index by Country Rank
 
Malta is ranked 16 out of 23 (not 27 because of ties), with Ireland at the top (high 
human development scores), and Romania at the bottom (low human development 
scores), Using an Excel spread sheet the correlation coefficient between the HDI data 
from this Table 19 above and the TPL% data from Table 13 for the 27 EU countries is 
calculated to be r = -.619. The value t is then computed using the same formula as above 
to be -3.94 and the probability of the non-directional null hypothesis is then .000577. 
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This indicates a significant inverse relationship and is illustrated in the scattergram 
Chart 29 below: 
Chart 29 
     Malta: red 
 
The correlation coefficient between the data sets for HDI and CPI is 0.755.  HDI 
and CPI are therefore highly correlated with a non-directional probability of the 
null hypothesis of <0.0001. 
 
In the analysis above it has been shown that for the 27 EU countries there are significant 
correlations between both the level of corruption (positive correlation) and the human 
development (negative correlation) of a country and to the amount of electrical power 
loss in their transmission and distribution systems.  Reducing corruption and increasing 
human development in a country is certainly very difficult to implement; however, if 
only partially successful it would engender benefits not only for this energy loss 
problem, but would greatly advance the quality of life for the people of Malta. The 
political system in Malta should be updated such that there would be real transparency 
in governance such that the people could have more confidence in their leaders. The 
reflection of honesty and transparency at the top would project less patience with 
dishonesty among the citizens. 
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iv. Public Relations Programs: 
It is recommended that Enemalta spend at least €3,000,000 per year on a public 
relations program to explain to the Maltese people that a theft from Enemalta is not a 
theft from some foreign entity, but is a theft from the people of Malta who pay their 
bills. Church and other ethical teachers would be enlisted and supported to convey the 
message that electricity theft is just as wrong as for example stealing a car. Success with 
these measures will add much needed financial strength to Enemalta, which will be of 
vital importance in fulfilling Malta‟s future energy needs. 
 
An International Utilities Revenue Protection Association (IURPA) has been 
established to promote the detection and prevention of power theft. (1) website- 
http://www.iurpa.org. They have regional revenue protection groups, but the United 
Kingdom is the only EU country that has formed a regional group- website- 
http://www.ukrpa.co.uk. Malta should perhaps form a regional protective group. 
 
2. Interconnectors versus the addition of Local Production Capacity 
(Delimara Extension) 
In this paper we have identified the need for additional power capacity in addition to 
that which is already planned (in the section Energy Shortfall). It is important to identify 
the best option for this additional capacity. By choosing the best option for this 
additional capacity in order to achieve the “20-20-20” goals, it will make the eventual 
complete transition to a renewable base that much easier. 
 
The reason why renewable production is not considered a viable option for expansion of 
base load capacity is due to the variability in their electrical outputs. A base load 
capacity source must be consistent in that if it is a 150 MW source then it must be able 
to produce at full capacity within a few hours. In order for a wind farm to guarantee 150 
MW of production it would have to be over 1500 MW (Mott Macdonald 2009) which is 
simply not viable for the Maltese Islands. Solar sources also cannot be considered since 
their production essentially stops during the night. Therefore, until an efficient means of 
storing electrical energy in very large quantities is developed, renewable sources cannot 
be considered as alternatives for base load or emergency power production capacity.  
The viable options for expansion of Malta‟s electrical capacity are either: 
74 
 
i. Expansion of local non-renewable capacity 
ii. Undersea interconnections 
 
The Delimara Extension has been promoted by the Maltese government and Enemalta 
as the best option for expansion of local power production, and therefore will be used as 
an analogue for the best option for expansion of local capacity. The Malta-Sicily 
interconnection was billed as the best option for interconnection and therefore will be 
used as an analogue for the best option for interconnection.  
 
The criteria for choosing the best option will include economics, environmental impact 
and reliability. No recent study has been performed which compares the relative merits 
of the two options, so derivations and a certain amount of assumptions (which will be 
explained) had to be made in order to produce meaningful results. 
 
i. The Delimara Power Extension 
Planned Expansions to Existing Non-Renewable Production Infrastructure 
 
The Delimara expansion is a 144 MW combined cycle diesel set of 8 x 18 MW piston 
engines and one 10 MW steam turbine which will have operating efficiencies of up to 
55%, compared to an average of 28% operating efficiency of other steam and gas units.  
The Danish company BSWC (Burmeister and Wain Scandinavian Contractor A/S) was 
awarded the contract for the construction and five year maintenance contract of the 
extension for a total cost to Enemalta of €183 million. This project is expected to be 
completed in 2011. [1]  
 
The cost of electrical energy generation with the BWSC diesel engines, factoring in 
current fuel prices is expected to be €c12.467 per kWh. CO2 emissions generated by 
diesel engines are 0.5894kg / kWh whilst CO2 emissions generated by gas engines are 
0.5605kg / kWh, making the difference negligible. [1]  
 
According to Enemalta, the Delimara power extension would result in a total reduction 
of dust emissions, reduce the annual emissions of CO2 by 470,000 tons, NOx by 2,300 
tons and SO2 by 6,300 tons due to abatement technology and high efficiency equipment. 




Unfortunately with the addition of a “confidentiality clause” within the BWSC / 
Enemalta contract, more detailed information concerning the project cannot be found, 
and statistics have to be taken at face value as provided by Enemalta. The 
confidentiality clause includes a provision that would cost Malta a significant amount in 
fines should details of the contract circulate without permission from BSWC. Such a 
confidentiality clause is unprecedented for the construction of a power generation 
facility in Malta (and anywhere else for that matter) and its inclusion has given rise to 
much public criticism regarding the project. [3] [4]  
 
Criticism of the project: 
The Labour Party opposition and the public have voiced criticism of the project on 
multiple occasions. They have expressed the opinion that Enemalta should have pursued 
gas-fired technology and that the use of heavy fuel oil will be detrimental to public 
health. 
 
A University of Malta Department of Physics Professor, Edward Mallia had urged not 
to use HFO (Heavy Fuel Oil) in the extension since Malta does not have the 
infrastructure to dispose of the estimated 14,000 ton/year toxic sludge byproduct created 
by the burning process. The waste would have to be transported away from the facility, 
which according to the original Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) could cost up 
to €12 million per year. [5] [6] 
 
 
ii. The Malta-Sicily Interconnection: 
In 2010 the contractor ABB was chosen to install a submarine interconnector between 
Malta and Sicily, as well as the auxiliary power infrastructure. The cable system will be 
a “high voltage AC three-core submarine XLPE cable operated at 220 kV”. [7]  
 
The landing points are Pembroke in Malta and Marina di Ragusa in Sicily as can be 








The first submarine-cable connection and supporting infrastructure are expected to be 
completed by the end of 2012 for a total cost of €150 million. The contract has 
provisions for the installation of an additional cable for an additional €150 million at a 
later date. Malta has received €20 million as a grant from the European Commission for 
the interconnector project, as well as an additional €5 million for its small isolated 





Figure 5: Depiction of the proposed 
submarine route from Sicily to Malta [7] 
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 Directly from the 2009 tender: 
“i. All equipment shall be sized so that each interconnector can continuously 
deliver approximately 250MVA at the receiving end at power factors ranging 
between 0.95 leading and 0.95 lagging in any direction at an ambient temperature 
of 45°C 
 
ii. In case of an emergency the interconnectors shall be able to transmit an 
overload of 70-80% for 1 hour even if the system is loaded at 90%, without 
exceeding allowable temperatures and without causing any damage to the 
equipment”   [7] 
  
Bidders did not meet all the specifications of the 2009 tender and so a new revised 
tender was issued in 2010 which included slight changes. One of these changes is that 
the requirement is for the cable to be able to transmit 200 MW of power at a capacity 
factor of 0.95. The average losses across the cable and system infrastructure is expected 
to be in the range of 4-7% and the cable is expected to have an operational lifespan of 
25-40 years at which point in time it will have to be replaced. [9]  
 
Power would be purchased by Enemalta from the Italian Electricity Market or GME 
(Gestore dei Mercati Energetici) which is freely traded and operates in real time. GME 
is divided into Italian geographical sectors with Sicily accounting for one of these. 
Electricity prices in Sicily are typically higher than they are in Southern Italy but Terna 
(an Italian Electricity Distributor) and other companies are expecting to expand the 
capacity of the connection from Sicily to the Italian main land and thus reduce Sicilian 
market prices.  
 
Sicily has two power transmission grids. The 220 kV grid is not sufficiently developed 
for handling the forecast demand increases while the 380 kV grid is not a complete ring 
which means that any fault on the line would disrupt the entire network. Significant 
strengthening of the transmission grid is underway and a completion of the 380 kV grid 
is expected in the next few years.  
 
In 2007 Sicily obtained over 7% of its energy supply from renewable sources (703 MW 
capacity from hydropower, 854.2MW from wind and 1.5 from photo voltaics). This 
large renewables base coupled with a high capacity of conventional thermal, means that 
Sicily is a net exporter of electricity and in 2007 exported 1.4 GWh of electricity to the 
Italian mainland via a single 380 kV submarine interconnection. With a number of 
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development permits for new wind projects it is expected that over the next few years 
wind power capacity in Sicily will increase by an additional 2000 MW. This additional 
expansion in wind capacity would mean that the Island would have a renewable share of 
almost 15% with over 10% sourced solely from wind resources. [10] This high energy 
supply from variable wind sources means that grid intermittency can occur particularly 
during periods of low demand. Wind resources cannot be shut off and in times when 
demand is very low if sudden strong winds occur then it can threaten to destabilize the 
network. Therefore the Malta-Sicily interconnection is not only a benefit for Malta but 
for Sicily as well since it: 
i. Increases the stability of their grid (since excess energy can be exported)  





Chart 30: August 2010 Italian Energy Breakdown by sector showing that 
Sicily provides 14% of its energy from renewable sources and the rest 

























Figure 6: May 2007 map of Italy highlighting 







It is difficult to calculate the net present value of a non-renewable project due to the 
nature of price fluctuation of the fuel source. Prices fluctuate on a real time basis and 
the variations in fuel prices from one year to another can be dramatic. For the purpose 
of comparison it can be assumed that current market prices can be used and 
extrapolated.  This is a valid assumption since a relative rather than absolute comparison 
is important.  
 
 
Malta-Sicily Interconnection Delimara Extension 
   Power Efficiency 
Factor 93-97 % [9] 46.9 % [13] 
   Capital Costs €150,000,000 [7] €165,000,000 [13] 
   Max Capacity 200 MW [7] 144 MW [13] 
   Maintenance Cost €1,500,000/yr € 3,600,000/yr 
 
(estimated)* (calculated)** 
   Waste Disposal 
Costs 0 
€ 2,500,000-12,000,000 / yr 
[12] 
   
Production Costs 
***Dependent on Sicilian 
Market prices [11] 
***Dependent on Heavy 
Fuel prices 
   Lifespan 25-40 years [9] 20-25 years [13] 
 




The cost of maintenance of the cable is difficult to quantify. As long as the cable is not 
unexpectedly damaged (by salinity intrusion, corrosion or shipping), then its operational 
costs are very low. However, unexpected and catastrophic occurrences must be factored 
in based upon their probability of occurrence. Such a study for this project is not 
publically available and thus these costs must be assumed. The highest cost of 
maintenance would be the price that would have to be paid on an annual basis for 
Table 20: Comparison of Malta-Sicily interconnection 
and Delimara Extension: Power efficiency factor, 





insurance of the cable. Other examples of such undersea projections place insurance 
costs at approximately 1% of total capital cost per year or €1.5 million per year.  
 
**Delimara Extension: 
Enemalta signed an €18 million 5-year maintenance agreement with BSWC, which 
amounts to €3.6 million / year. However, reciprocating diesel engines are particularly 
prone to deterioration and machine failure when they are ten years old or more.  









Delimara Extension (fuel costs): €466 million 
 
NPV (Net Present Value) Unit Cost:  
             Net Electricity 
    NPV €        MWh         Unit cost (EMC financial report) 





Chart 31: Average Italian electricity price per 
annum [11] 
 
Table 21: Results of calculations for the Delimara Extension to 






The cost of generating electricity was 12.467 €c / kWh at the expansion for an outlook 
of 12 years, considering January 2007 heavy fuel oil prices of $244.59 per metric tonne 
(equivalent to €188.92 using conversion rates at the time). Price escalation was done in 
the Delimara extension analysis by performing predictive extrapolation of 1997 – 2007 
heavy fuel oil data. The escalation factor for the Delimara extension was 22.3 $ per 
tonne per year or a linear increase of 9.12% per year over the January 2007 price.  
[13] 
 
A price escalation analysis must also be used for predictive analysis of the future 
average cost of electricity in Sicily. Historical Sicily electricity market data were 






Between December 2005 and August 2010 the linear correlation increased from 8.2 to 
10.3 €c / kWh. For a 4.67 year time period the linear trend increased by 2.1 €c / kWh. 
This is an increase of 0.45 €c / kWh / year. In January 2007, Sicily had an average 
electricity price of 8.223 €c/kWh [11]. Therefore this price escalation represents a linear 
increase of 5.49% per year increase over January 2007 Sicily electricity prices.  
Chart 32: Forecasting price appreciation factor for electricity 
prices in Sicily; the chart is based upon info obtained from 






The same criteria (such as money cost) were used as in the report done on the Delimara 
extension producing the results of: 
 




In other words, for the same 12 year outlook, the Malta-Sicily interconnection is        
0.05 €c / kWh cheaper (12.47 – 12.42).  
 
Calculations were also done for the Delimara Extension in order to confirm the 
accuracy of the EMC numbers provided. 
Table 22: Economics of Malta-Sicily Interconnection- for the same 12 
year outlook, the Malta-Sicily interconnection is 0.05 €c / kWh cheaper 





Calculations for the extension were based on: 
Metric Tonne Heavy Fuel Oil Energy Equivalent (MWh): 12.28 
Price of Heavy Fuel Oil January 2007 (Euro / Metric Tonne): 188.92 






It was found that the price of electricity for the Extension depends heavily on the 
average hourly annual production that the station provides. Load spreading due to off 
peak demand and down time due to maintenance determines that the average annual 
Table 23: Economics of Delimara Extension shown with 





production is not at full capacity. The official EMC report calculated net electricity 
produced over the 12 year period as 6,436,200 MWh or 536,350 MWh per year. This is 
equivalent to an average annual production per hour of 61.19 MW or 42.49%. 
 
The result of 15.4 €c / kWh is significantly over the figure provided by EMC. The 
reason for this could be that the numbers used for waste disposal costs in the report were 





Table 24: Economics of Delimara Extension with revised 







Expansion of local generation: 
- Local Employment (during construction and operational phase) 
- Supply of electricity that is under direct control of Malta 
- Preservation of „isolated island status‟ and the benefits of subsidy associated 
with it 
Interconnection: 
- Every MW transmitted is a MW that does not need to be generated locally and 
thus cuts overall local emissions of all types. (SO2, NO2, CO2, dust particulate 
etc…)  
- More economic as shown in the comparison (2.5 c / kWh cheaper over a 12 year 
time frame) 
- Required for expansion of local renewable resources to a high production level 
(>7-8%) since the isolated Maltese network is not capable of handling the high 
load fluctuations, especially during times of low demand 
- Opens Malta to the Italian electricity market and would thus allow for the sale of 
excess generated electricity 
- Helps to improve the overall stability and reliability of the Maltese grid 
- Introduces potential competition to the Maltese electricity market 
 
Relative Disadvantages: 
Expansion of local generation: 
- Continued local emissions impacting both health and the environment 
- Significantly less economic than an interconnection of similar capacity 
- Requirement for more land area for further local capacity expansion 
Interconnection: 
- Potential jeopardy of „small isolated island status‟ and the benefits of subsidy 
associated with it 
- Dependent on another country for electricity needs 
With full weighting of the economic, social and environmental benefits / detriments of 
both options for future capacity expansion it is concluded that the option of 
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interconnection provides significantly more important positives in all three areas over 
the option of expansion of local generation.  
 
3. Investment in Renewable Projects in other EU Countries (North Sea) and being 
Statistically Transferred with Renewable Energy Generation Versus Investment in 
Local Renewable Projects 
 
Directive Cooperation Mechanisms: 
 
The EU Renewable Energy Directive allows flexible measures for Member States to 
achieve their individual targets in an economic and sensible way. These measures 
include the provision that Member States may statistically transfer credits for renewable 
energy, cooperate on joint projects targeted for the production of renewable energy, and 
coordinate national support schemes. In other words, energy produced from renewable 
sources in one Member State may count towards the national target of the Member State 
participating in the project. 
 
The importance of these cooperation mechanisms is that, because of geographical 
factors, different Member States have different qualities of renewable energy resources 
and ability to exploit these resources. Member States are encouraged to engage in these 
cooperative mechanisms in cases where a Member State can derive significant benefits 
from “outsourcing” its renewable energy production. Large scale land based wind / 
solar projects have been essentially ruled out for the Maltese Islands due to lack of land 
availability and high cost of land that is available. Offshore wind has been presented by 
government as the most economic and least environmentally harmful resource for Malta 
to exploit on a large scale. The purpose of this section is to evaluate the relative 
economics and environmental consequences of a local versus a foreign wind farm in 
which Malta invests in the project in another Member State and is thus credited with 
renewable energy produced from the project. 
  
“The Second National Communication of Malta to the United Nations Convention on 
Climate Change” report, May 2010 states: 
 
                        “…at a 10% contribution from the wind, grid stability starts  
        to suffer… In the case of Malta, for the 10% contribution from a source 
        under a single wind regime, it was found that almost as much stand-by 
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        capacity is required as that provided by wind, in order to avoid grid  
        instabilities. That would offset most of the benefits of wind generation.” [1] 
 
Considering the above statement, which appeared in the latest report from a panel of 
experts from Malta to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change, it would 
seem prudent to rethink any consideration of spending hundreds of millions of Euros on 
wind farm projects in Malta. 
 
The Malta Environment and Planning Authority (MEPA) web site currently shows all 
three wind farm planning applications as:  “…application has been passed to a case 
officer to assess the development proposal in terms of Structure Plan and other 
established policies”. 
 
AIS Environmental is the company that is conducting the environmental impact studies 
for the three proposed wind farm sites as well as the controversial Delimara extension.   
When contacted, the AIS Environmental  representative stated that Hal Far requires an 
Appropriate Assessment (AA) and technical studies but Is-Sikka l-Bajda (the white reef) 
and Bahrija require an EIA as well as an EIS, (Environmental Impact Statement ). The 
two onshore MEPA applications have a target date of November 2010 and the offshore 
site has a target date of January 2011.  [2]      
 
Bahrija and Hal-Far are both onshore sites with estimated potential wind capacity of 
10.2MW and 4.2 MW respectively.  Sikka l-Bajda, located on a reef 1.5-2 km from the 
coast, has an estimated wind potential of up to 95MW.  If approved the three wind farm 
projects would begin around 2012 and would give Malta wind energy potential of 
109.4MW with an estimated annual electricity generation of 254GWh. [3]  
 
The Bahrija application is the more problematic onshore application as it is located in a 
„rural conservation area‟ (RCA) but has 19 trellis masts which can be used to monitor 
wind (formerly belonging to Maltacom) which are not in use.  Wind speed 
measurements have been ongoing at Bahrija and are adequate to determine wind data. 
One favorable argument for Hal Far and Bahrija is that onshore sites have a short time 




 Is-Sikka l-Bajda   
                            “If the offshore reef off Mellieha is not adequate for a wind  
                             farm,  Malta will be „stuck‟ and will probably have to ask the 
                             EU  to re-consider its expectations.” 
George Pullicino, Resources Minister, speaking at the inauguration of the 80 meter high 
wind monitoring mast at l-Ahrax, November 2009   
 
Sikka l-Bajda as a wind farm location had originally been evaluated by the consulting 
firm of Mott Macdonald (MML), U.K. in 2005. In that report Mott Macdonald advised 
against building a wind farm on Sikka l-Bajda for financial, visual and environmental 
reasons. In their 2005 report Mott experts recommended that Malta start with a medium 
sized onshore wind project and stated that Sikka L-Bajda was only „marginally suitable‟ 
for wind power as the capacity factor is low (estimated at only 25%) due to the reef‟s 
close proximity to shore and the location which lacks direct exposure to the prevailing 
northwesterly winds.  [4a]  
 
 
In 2009 Mott Macdonald was re-commissioned to perform another feasibility study 
based upon water depth up to 30m. The 2009 MML study estimates Sikka l-Bajda‟s 
wind capacity factor at 25%, while similar wind farms in the North Sea have a capacity 
factor of 40%. According to the report the energy produced by this wind farm, located 
approximately 2 km from shore, would provide 4% of Malta‟s energy needs, providing 
clean energy for approximately 21,000 households. By way of comparison that amount 
is similar to the energy demand of Smart City which is estimated to be 3.6% of the 
national electricity generation capacity.  In order to produce the 50MW needed to reach 
the 4% target the wind farm at Sikka l-Bajda would need seventeen 5 MW turbines with 
80 meter diameter rotors. [4b] With regard to the feasibility of a wind farm on Sikka l-
Bajda, the 2009 MML report states: 
        “…it does exhibit a relatively low estimated capacity factor.  The project 
          will not significantly benefit from economies of scale…and may be subject 
             to significant costs associated with vessel availability.” [5] 
 
However, the Government‟s Committee for Wind Energy (CoWE) July 2008 report 
states, “Inside the 20 meter depth contour, Sikka l-Bajda has sufficient space for some 
30 MW of generating capacity.  This capacity can be increased to 70-90 MW if the 
surrounding outcrops in the area up to depths of 25 meters are considered.  No other 
reef around Malta offers this potential in so compact a form.”  [6] 
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 “A sizeable tariff would be necessary to make a wind farm in this region 
financially viable”, the 2009 Mott Macdonald study concluded that energy produced 
from Sikka l-Bajda wind farm would have to be sold at a high price. The same MML 
report notes that a more viable option would be to buy „renewable energy credits‟ from 
other states who abide by their renewable energy (RE) targets or to invest in a RE 
project within the EU and take a share of RE credits from the project.  [4b] 
 
It was announced in August 2010 that AIS Environmental located in Fgura, Malta had 
been awarded the tender (worth €295,000) to perform the EIA for Sikka l-Bajda.  AIS  
performed the EIA for the contentious Delimara Power Station heavy fossil fuel burning 
extension  after the contract with BWSC had already been signed.  
 
The proposed Sikka l-Bajda wind farm awaits the results of the data collected from the 
80 meter l-Ahrax monitor (launched November 2009) which has been given a two year 
MEPA permit. The wind data used in the 2009 Mott Macdonald (MML) report were 
collected from several sources including: Luqa Airport (which is 18 km from Sikka l-
Bajda and is in a very different environment), National Centre for Atmospheric 
Research (NCAR) and the European Wind Atlas.  [4b]  
 
The 2009 MML report estimates the approximate wind speed to be between 6.5m/s and 
7.5m/s while the European Wind Atlas predicts a wind speed range of 5.5m/s to 
7.0m/s.[7] 
 
Sikka l-Bajda is Malta‟s only shallow reef which is large enough for an offshore wind 
farm; thus, the only other offshore wind farm possibility is to pursue deep water 
technology which at this point in time is not adequately advanced. 
 
               “Political considerations seem to have prevailed…it is evident they 
                 have rescued Sikka l-Bajda from oblivion after they previously    
     dismissed it in their 2005 report”  
 
Shadow Minister of Alternative Energy Leo Brincat referring to the contradictory Mott 
Macdonald reports 2005 vs. 2009. [8] 
 
The Sikka l-Bajda project would require an enormous capital expenditure (capex), 
estimated to be between €280 and 350 million, based upon the capex costs of  
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€3,000kW/ to 3,500/kW of installed capacity, and a hefty offshore operating cost (opex) 
estimated to be “in the region of Euros €77 / kW-87 / kW per annum‟‟. [9]  
 
Comparison of power efficiency of  Sikka l-Bajda with power efficiency at Gunfleet 
Sands, U.K. (a recently constructed (2008-10) North Sea offshore wind farm): 
 
 Gunfleet Sands:   37.8% power capacity factor 
 Sikka l-Bajda:    21.6% power capacity factor 
 
Computations of power efficiency for Sikka l-Bajda (proposed) and Gunfleet Sands, UK 
(actual) wind farms: 
Gunfleet Sands annual production:  
Gunfleet Sands produces 570 GWh/yr [Reference: Dong Energy] [10] 
(570*1000)/ (365.25*24) = 65.02 MW average power produced during the year 
Dimensional analysis for the above: (MWh/yr)/h/yr = MW 
[(65.02 MW) /172 MW)]*100 = 37.8% power capacity factor 
 
Sikka l-Bajda:  
Sikka l-Bajda produces 180 GWh/yr [Reference : Sikka Proposal] [7] 
(180*1000)/ (365.25*24) = 20.53 MW average power produced during the year 
Dimensional analysis for the above: (MWh/yr)/h/yr = MW 















Sikka l-Bajda (projected) vs Gunfleet Sands, UK (actual) 
   
 
Sikka l-Bajda Wind Farm Gunfleet Sands Wind Farm 
Power 
  Capacity Factor 21.6% - 31.0 % Projected [11]* 37.8% Actual [11] 
   Capital Costs €280,000,000-350,000,000 [12] €537,420,178 [13] 
   Max Capacity 95 MW [14] 172 MW [13] 
   # of Turbines 17-19 [14] 48 [13] 
   Distance to Shore 1.5 km-(2.2 for wind farm) [14] 7 km [13] 
   Operating Cost € 7,315,000-8,265,000/yr  €10,828,000/yr 
 
        (estimated) [15]**                (calculated) [16]** 






*capacity factor from Mott Macdonald, 2009: 21.6%-30% 
 
** Calculated from this report using     €.019/kWh for  O&M 
  Computation for determining operating cost of Gunfleet Sands Wind Farm, UK:   
172 MW *(1000)* 37.8 power capacity factor(/100) * 365.25 days/yr * 24 hrs/day *  
€.019/kWh  =  €10,828,000 O&M costs/year 
 
 
Table 25: Comparison of a potential Sikka l-Bajda Wind 











Risk of Construction at Sikka l-Bajda  
 
The risks associated with planning a project which has the magnitude of Sikka l-Bajda 
are far reaching and may partly be categorized as:    
 
 Over estimation of wind capacity factor 
 Scale of project may render the project non-economically feasible 
 Environmental impacts, health issues and public non-acceptance 
 Lack of financing possibilities 
 
There is a need for accurate wind data from the L-Ahrax mast, environment evaluations 
(EIA and EIS), seabed condition evaluations (platform support) and evaluation of the 
recently discovered dolines (sink holes), assessment of the seabed route for export cable 
to shore.  
 
Chart 33: Wind energy potential in the North Sea, contrasting  











While performing a research project in May 2010, two University of Malta research 
scientists discovered two large sinkholes, one of which is 240 m wide and 8 meters deep 
and the second is half that size. The sonar technology used also revealed that the reef is 
already damaged by constant bunkering and bombing during WW II. [18] Further 
studies need to be performed to determine the extent of the damage as the reef must 
provide support for the turbines‟ foundation.  The foundation and underlying base must 
be capable of withstanding the hydrodynamic forces of the sea, the weight of the 19 
turbine system, and loads from the turbine operation.  
 
Quantification of Capital Costs (capex) for Installing a Wind Farm at Is-Sikka l-
Bajda 
         “Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs for wind power are 
           double or triple the figures originally projected” [19] according to Wind 
Energy Update 2010.  The Wind Energy Update: Operations and Maintenance Report 
2010 was compiled with statistics from over 100 operators and providers with an aim to 
understand the trend in development of wind O&M.  
 
In April 2009, Prime Minister Gonzi announced that the estimate for the proposed Sikka 
l-Bajda wind farm had increased from the prior budget estimate of €130 million to more 
than double with a new estimate of between €280-335 million. The April 2009 MRRA 
proposal for a wind farm at Is-Sikka l-Bajda states a different figure from that on the 
EEA wind farm report (detailed on the following page); instead, they use a figure from 
Figure 7: One of the two dolines (sink holes) at Sikka l- 





European Wind Energy Association (EWEA, 2008) which predicts the cost to be about 
€2,350/kW. The MRA proposal goes further to cushion the window of cost for a further 
addition of 25% to 50% more for the cost. They justify the leap in cost by stating that 
pre-drilling would be required for foundation pile driving and the report adds that there 
is a lack of specialized installation sea vessels in the Mediterranean, unlike in the North 
Sea area.  
 
The cryptic „Capital Costs‟ (capex) paragraph contained in the 107 page Proposal for 
Sikka l-Bajda concludes with: “It is estimated that the total range can vary between 
2940 and 3525 €/kW.  Therefore, the initial “capital investment cost for the 95 MW 
wind farm will be in the range of € 280 to 335 million‟‟. [4b] 
 
According to the European Wind Energy Association, the current quantification of wind 
energy costs for installing capacity are estimated to be approximately 1,000 €/kW for 
onshore and €1,200-2,000/kW for offshore wind farms. [20] Using the estimated costs 
provided by EWEA, the wind farm at Sikka l-Bajda, which is estimated at providing 95 
MW (maximum capacity), the computation of cost for constructing such a facility on 
the reef 1.5 km offshore is as follows: 
 
At the low end cost would be:   
95 MW * €1,200 Euros/kW * 1,000 (MW/kW conversion) = €114,000,000  
 
At the high end the cost would be:   
95MW * €2,000 Euros/kW * 1,000(/MW/kW conversion = €190,000,000  
 
From the table below one can deduce that the onshore wind energy costs are primarily 
from the cost of turbines, whereas, for offshore wind farm the cost of the grid 
connection and foundation compose a significant part of the investment. As of 2009 
there was a shortage of offshore wind turbines and the costs are expected to decrease 








      
Enemalta is a state-owned corporation and as such is in a more favorable position to 
obtain funding for a large RE project such as an offshore wind farm. Financing offshore 
wind farms on a non recourse basis has seen a very different impact on government 
utility companies vs. independent developers: government utilities are able to fund their 
projects from their balance sheets for such projects while the independent developers 
are met with lack of funds to finance projects due to the current credit crisis. Banks are 
not willing to commit to underwriting loans and banks have taken a much more 
conservative approach to lending. Also, offshore wind is a rather new technology with 
unproven results coupled with a short life span of only 20-25 years, thus, „risk 
management‟ is a major factor for such a multi-million Euro project. [23] 
 
Predicting the cost of electric power from a potential wind farm at Sikka l-Bajda can 
only be done within a narrow margin of uncertainty once wind studies have been 
accurately detailed for a period of at least one year. That would mean November 2010 at 
the earliest as the time when valid data will have been collected from L-Ahrax for the 
purpose of cost computation without a large margin of error.  
 
For the purpose of computation of cost of generating from Is-Sikka l-Bajda, wind speed 
varies between 6.6 and 7.6 m/s at hub height. The report projects that the costs of 
energy for this wind speed range to vary between 17 and  26.5 € cents/kWh. The report 
further qualifies this by stating that it would be unlikely that the price of electricity from 
this wind farm would be lower than 18  € cents / kWh and also stated that the numbers 
Table 26: Investment cost escalation for offshore 






are subject to technical/economic evaluation.  As there was no wind data available for 
the immediate area around Sikka l-Bajda the 2009 MML report utilized wind data from 
various sources including: Luqa Airport (which is 18 km from Sikka l-Bajda and is in a 
very different environment), National Centre for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) and 
the European Wind Atlas.[4b] The report estimates the approximate wind speed to be 
between 6.5m/s and 7.5m/s while the European wind atlas predicts a wind speed range 
of 5.5m/s-7.0m/s. [5]   
 
We have shown that an offshore wind farm at Sikka l-Bajda is most probably 
uneconomic for several powerful reasons. It is therefore highly doubtful that a private 
company would undertake the project without some type of substantial subsidy from the 
government. There is an EU policy against state aid to private industry except in special 
circumstances. [22] Any subsidy from the Government must be paid for by the Maltese 
taxpayers; moreover, any private wind power company would be in competition with 
Enemalta.  As Enemalta is an electric power monopoly, it would then have a 
tremendous conflict of interest as to when to use the power generated from the local 
wind farm. 
 
Malta has already generated major criticism for the manner in which the BWSC 
contract for the Delimara Extension was negotiated. The government of Malta still has 
not responded to the corruption enquires of the European Commission. The BWSC 
shows the importance of managing public procurement processes in ways that are so 
transparent that they do not leave any room not only for the possibility of corruption but 












































Table 30: Gunfleet Sands economics Best case scenario for   











6% cost of money, €13 c / kWh, Sikka at operating efficiency of 31%. “Best case” 
scenario to show that even at the high operating efficiency range Sikka l-Bajda, 
Gunfleet Sands still comes out as 260 million Euros more economic. 
Worst case scenario for Sikka il-Bajda 
 
 












6% cost of money, €23 c / kWh, Sikka at operating efficiency of 21.6%. “Worst 
case” scenario to show that at lowest estimated ranges for Sikka, Gunfleet Sands is 
€ 1.7 billion more economic.  
 





6% cost of money, €17 c / kWh, Sikka at operating efficiency of 25%. In the 
conservative case scenario for Sikka l-Bajda, Gunfleet Sands is € 800 million more 
economic. 
 
Price discrepancies that exist between Malta and the UK must also be factored in 
determining the economic viability of a project. The UK has slightly cheaper electricity 
with the average price for household consumers in the second semester 2009 being €14 
c / kWh. For the same time frame the average price for household consumers in Malta 
was €15.2 c / kWh.  
[23] [24] [25] 
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Using the most recent electricity price data for Malta and the UK, the Sikka Il-Bajda 
project would lose €100 million while the Gunfleet Sands project would earn €400 
million. Therefore in a conservative case, even factoring in the cheaper electricity prices 
in the UK (which would reduce profit), the Gunfleet Sands project is still €500 million 
more economic.  
 
One argument for having a local wind farm over a foreign one would be the benefit to 
the local economy due to employment and construction contracting. However, these 
economic benefits can be quantified.  
 
Quantification of Benefit to Local Economy: 
The actual construction contract for Sikka l-Bajda would be awarded to a foreign 
company as no local construction company has the expertise to lay offshore wind farms. 
Therefore, most of the 50 employees during the projected 1 year constructional phase 
would be foreign workers and thus have minimal benefits for the local economy. The 
Chart 37: Conservative case scenario economic comparison factoring 






wind farm would employ 15 full time employees during the operational phase and if it 
is assumed that these are all Maltese and they are paid an average wage 
 of 30,000  € / year (very high for Malta) then this would amount to 450,000 €/year or 
11.25 million Euros over the 25 year operational period. Therefore the benefit to the 
local economy is inconsequential when compared to the potential 1 billion Euros that 
can be saved by investing in a foreign project rather than building locally. [5] 
 
Imports and joint projects with non-EU countries 
 
The EU renewable energy directive allows for member states to invest in non-EU 
countries to achieve their renewable goal. The difference is that the member state must 
demonstrate that the same amount of electricity produced from the renewable location 
can be physically transported from the investment location to the investing member 
state. In cases where projects with long lead times are considered then the EU may 
allow for a statistical credit of renewable electricity for what the renewable investment 
would have produced if it had been operational, to accommodate for the construction 
phase. The most suitable non-EU country that Malta could cooperate with for such a 
project would be Tunisia. With low labor costs, low land costs, proximity to Malta, very 
good solar and wind potential, it could potentially develop into an ideal location for 
such a renewable investment.  
 
This option was not considered for Malta, as the scale required for such a project to 
make it economic would be too large. The opportunity is there however in the future for 
a possible joint-member project, most probably with Italy who has already undergone 
feasibility studies for a proposed Tunisia-Sicily interconnection that has resulted in 
favorable economic results. Once this Tunisia-Sicily interconnection has been 
constructed, it will allow for the possibility of a renewable investment project in 
Tunisia, and the subsequent direct exportation of this energy to Malta via the Malta-
Sicily interconnection. Since the proposed Tunisia-Sicily interconnection is tentative 
and not planned to be constructed until at least 2016, the option of joint projects with 
non-EU countries was not considered for Malta, as it would result in too short of a 
timeframe in which to implement, and a renewable action plan cannot be based on a 






4. Consumer end efficiency improvements  
 
It has been shown in section 1 that it is possible for Malta to achieve its 2016 efficiency 
goals of 9% reduction in power generation over values of what they would have been 
had the efficiency measures not been introduced solely through the reduction of theft, 
technical losses, and power station self consumption. With the forecast of “business as 
usual” levels being 3,250,000 MWh, a 10% reduction represents an energy savings of 
325,000 MWh. [1] 
 
The current losses of electric energy distribution are already accounted for in the 
forecast of Malta‟s 2020 gross final electricity consumption. This means that any 
savings of plant self-consumption and distribution losses count as energy savings and 
thus are energy efficiency improvements. 
 
Enemalta has projected that self consumption will be reduced from 5.48% in 2010 to 
3.83% in 2020 (for a savings of 1.65%) due to the phasing out of old power plants, plant 
efficiency improvement measures, and the introduction of the Malta-Sicily 
interconnection.  
 
With 13.1% total power losses (including 5% of this being technical losses) in the grid, 
Enemalta estimates that technical distribution losses will be reduced from 5% to 4% 
with the introduction of smart metering (for a savings of 1%).  
 
Furthermore the loss due to tampered meters (approximately 5%) should be effectively 
eliminated with the comprehensive installation of the smart meter system and an 
extensive inspection program (for a savings of 5%).  
 
The other 3% of total losses stems from direct line tapping theft and billing mistakes. 
Direct line tapping is much harder to combat than meter tampering as it is very difficult 





Malta currently has total power losses of 13.1% but should be able to bring its total 
power losses down at least to the level of Cyprus of 4.55% and ideally down to 
Luxembourg‟s levels of 1.42%. Both Cyprus and Luxembourg are significantly larger 
than Malta with longer distribution networks; the size of a network is the main limiting 
factor to achieving optimal technical efficiency. Malta with its much smaller 
transmission distances should theoretically be able to achieve losses that are less than 
the losses of those countries.  
 
If Malta were to achieve Cyprus‟ level of total power losses that would represent an 
improvement of 8.55%. If the expected self consumption savings of 1.65% is added to 
this figure then it is possible for Malta to achieve a 10.2% efficiency improvement. 
Therefore it should be possible for Malta to achieve its 2020 efficiency goals through 
power generation efficiency improvements and reduction of losses in the transmission 
grid. However, just because it is possible for Malta to achieve its goals solely through 
generation and transmission improvements does not mean that end-user energy 
efficiency improvements should be ruled out since smart and cost effective end-user 
efficiency improvements can be extremely economic, save on electricity, and thus 
mitigate the emissions footprint.  
 





The pie chart below displays the consumption of electricity by utility in the average 
Maltese household. Water heating represents almost a quarter of total domestic 
electrical consumption. It is a section of the pie that can potentially be cost effectively 
reduced by the large scale installation of renewable solar water heating. Lighting is also 
a big destination for domestic consumption and is projected to be reduced by up to 80% 







The table below quantifies the estimated savings possible following consumer end 
efficiency improvements. As indicated in the pie chart above, lighting and water heating 
are the areas where the most improvement can be made for the least cost. A transition to 
CFLs and solar water heaters could result in a domestic energy savings of 74 GWh, thus 
producing a 2.3% efficiency improvement.  
 
Space heating and air conditioning represent slices of the pie that will continue to grow 
in coming years as populations continue to grow and living requirements go up unless 
insulation measures are implemented. 
 
The total projected consumer end efficiency improvements (minus smart metering 
which was considered in section 4.1. as a transmission improvement) amount to 189 
GWh saved by 2016 affecting a 5.8% efficiency improvement.  




















Example of Energy Savings from Industry (Reverse Osmosis Plants) 
 
An average Reverse Osmosis (RO) plant needs approximately six kilowatt-hours of 
electricity to desalinate one cubic meter of water meaning that the process is not only 
energy intensive but costly. Malta‟s RO Plants produced a total of 17 million cubic  
meters of water in 2007 (57% of total water usage). This represented a total energy 
consumption of about 60,000 GWh [4]. Since energy consumption at RO plants is a 
major cost, the Water Services Corporation (WSC)  embarked on a multitude of 
investments to increase energy efficiency including the installation of  Pelton wheels at 
Pembroke which increased efficiency from 4.5 kWh / m3 to 3.6 kWh / m
3
 and pressure 
exchangers at Ghar Lapsi, increasing efficiency from 4.8 kWh/m
3
 to 3.2 kWh/m
3
[5]. 
The combination of these efficiency improvements have resulted in a total energy 
saving of over 13 million kWh / year or 13 GWh/year. This will represent a national 
energy savings of 0.4% for 2020 and with an average cost of electricity at 10c / kWh 
this represents a savings of 1.3 million Euro / year. The investments were capital 
intensive but due to the over 30% reduction in energy consumption per m
3
 of water 
produced they were extremely good investments which resulted in a return on 
investment of less than four years. [6] 
 
The 2008 Malta Energy Efficiency Action Plan gives a guideline for energy savings for 
energy end use in line with Directive 2006/32/EC. The Target adopted for 2016 was:    
9% energy efficiency of 378 GWh energy savings per year. [3] 
 
Unfortunately, such success stories of significant energy savings within industry are rare 
as there is little incentive for industry to aggressively pursue energy efficiency 
measures. The reason for this is that prices of electricity for industry are kept artificially 
low. 
 
In Malta industry actually pays less for electric energy than it costs to produce. The 
result of being able to acquire a cheap source of electricity is that there is much less 
incentive for energy efficiency. There is an EU policy against state aid to private 
industry except in special circumstances [7]. The present policy of subsidizing Maltese 
industry with below cost electric power is probably a violation of this policy.  It is 
therefore recommended that electricity prices for industry be raised to at least a level 
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which reflects the cost of production. With a rise in prices, industry would be 
incentivized to implement energy efficiency measures that have good return on 
investments as that would then become economic due to the increased potential for 
money savings. Such a rise in prices may cause economic pain in the short term but 
would result in a much more efficient and economically viable economy over the long 
term. Any price rise should be well programmed and announced in advance to assuage 
the negative impacts stemming from such a rise.  
 
Conservation Voltage Reduction 
 
Conservation Voltage Reduction (CVR) is a reduction of energy consumption as a result 
of a reduction in feeder voltage. Pursuant to an article in the October issue of the IEEE 
Spectrum, reducing the end user voltage levels to the lower end of the allowable voltage 
band in the USA reduces end user power consumption by up to 6% in certain 
appliances. For example induction motors used in many appliances such as fans and 
refrigerators usually operate at a lower mechanical load than they are rated to handle. 
Higher voltages therefore generate stronger magnetic fields than the motors can use, 
thus wasting energy. [8] This power conservation technique is explained extensively in 
“Evaluation of Conservation Voltage Reduction (CVR) on a National Level”, July 2010 
[9] where CVR is shown capable of providing peak load reductions and annual energy 
reductions in the USA of approximately 1.5%-4% depending on the specific feeder.  
The EU regulations for voltage are now 230 V ±10% (207V-253V). [10] The 
implementation of the Smart Meter Grid system could facilitate the introduction of CVR 
into Malta. 
 
CVR is therefore ideal, because meaningful energy savings can be accomplished 









VII. Consequences of Non-Achievement  
Matters of renewable non compliance are referred to the ECJ (European Court of 
Justice) which would then impose penalties that correspond to the same amount that 
Malta would have to invest to reach its obligations. These penalties would have to be 
paid until the time that Malta becomes compliant; therefore, these penalty measures 
incentivize compliance. 
A 2010 report by the National Audit Office (NAO) details the potential financial 
liability for Malta should it not achieve its mandatory 2020 renewable goals. The 
conclusions of this report were that Malta‟s contingent liability for renewable energy 
shortfall could range from “€2.9 to €36.1 million for every one percent shortfall from 
the renewable energy targets”.  The report goes on to state that further risks of non-
attainment of renewable goals include further non-compliance costs that stem from 
other EU directives. [1] 
Non attainment of renewable goals could mean that Malta would not reach its CO2 
emissions target as stated in Directive 2001/81/EC which could result in an obligation to 
purchases CO2 allowances that would cost between €90 and €100 per tonne to make up 
the shortfall. [1] However, the CO2 allowance market is highly variable and prices could 
be considerably lower than this by 2020. 
Solely from an economic perspective it is not worth it for Malta to miss its 2020 
renewable goals by any amount as the EU penalty measures are designed to ensure that 
Member States are fully incentivized to meet their goals.  
In addition to the heavy financial liability that stems from non-attainment of 2020 




Health Liability: a continued dependence on local non-renewable power production 
facilities would mean that emissions would continue to be a hazard especially for an 
Island like Malta where any power plant is within a short distance of built up urban 




Bad Publicity: non-attainment of 2020 renewable goals would result in bad publicity 
for Malta. Numerous newspaper articles have already been written criticizing Malta for 
lagging behind achieving its renewable goals (based upon the assigned trajectory from 
the EU). Such publicity may severely impact the tourism industry for Malta.    
 
Political Liability: (loss of national prestige): other member states that have put 
considerable effort into achieving their respective goals could look unfavorably towards 
other member states that fall behind in reaching their goals, thus causing a lag in 
achievement of the Union wide goal. Due to Malta‟s small size, its effects on the EU 
targets are minimal, so the issue here is more of principle than substance. 
 
Continued Dependence on Foreign Oil: the less of a renewable share Malta has, the 
more dependent it will be on oil imports that predominately come from non European 
Union countries (mostly North African and Middle Eastern) to which Malta does not 
necessarily have the best diplomatic relations with and which can be politically 
tumultuous.    
 
Clearly, Malta should make its utmost to achieve its 2020 goals in the most economic 
and least environmentally impacting way possible as the consequent liabilities of non-


















Malta‟s energy politics 
 
This paper is not in any way attempting to tackle the political and/or corporate structure 
of Malta‟s energy sector; however, it is impossible to disassociate the implementation of 
renewable energy projects from the inherent conflicts of interest associated with 
Enemalta.  Enemalta‟s status as an energy monopoly controlled by the government 
which is in turn controlled by an  elected political party obviously sublimates all else to 
political concerns i.e., votes.  Elections in Malta are decided on razor thin margins 
between two parties; the 2008 election was decided on just over 1,000 votes. [1] With 
so much riding on a few hundred votes, decisions are often made by placing the political 
process first.  Political cronyism can be a strong influence, especially if there is a lack of 
transparency when entering into contracts.  
Just two days prior to the March 2008 election the Emission Laws of Malta were 
changed: 
          “The change…occurred at a very late stage, just a few days before 
            the expiry of  deadline for the receipt of the final bids…to benefit 
            one of the exceptions to the applicability of the Large Combustion 
            Plant Directive…” [2] 
Minister Michael Barnier, EC Commission, June 2010 in his letter to malta’s Foreign 
Minister, Tonio Borg 
 
The change of the Emissions Law increased the emission limits for diesel engines, but 
retained current emission values for gas plants, thereby giving an unfair advantage to 
BWSC, the only company offering a tender for a diesel powered plant. In June 2010, 
European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services Michel Barnier sent a letter to 
Malta (which has not been published by the Government but is published by the 
opposition Labor Party) the contents of which raises serious doubts as to the legality of 
Malta‟s changes to the emission rules in the tender document; which the EC says was 
carried out to benefit the Danish firm BWSC‟s bid for a diesel-powered engine that had 
been previously ruled out because of existing emission laws. [3] 
 
The EU is currently facing a catharsis and EU Members of Parliament are presently  
(29
th
 October, 2010)  in Brussels to discuss strengthening sanctions against member 
countries that breach deficit rules. With no fiscal discipline, EU countries have no 
incentive to comply with EU directives.  The EC is considering placing „sanctions‟ on 
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members that exceed a debt threshold of 60% of GDP.[4]   In 2009 Malta debt stood at 
about 70% of GDP; however, that 70% of GDP debt doesn‟t include the ever rising debt 
Enemalta continues to accumulate. [5] [See Appendix A, Table A7] 
 
Malta is a small densely populated island country which magnifies problems relating to 
energy production. The scale of production is an essential factor in determining cost-
effectiveness of a project; however larger and  more cost-effective projects are not an 
option for Malta due to lack of spatial availability and lack of demand. As a permanent 
member of the European Union, Malta is now secure in its status; thus, investment and 
reliance on other Member States should be considered politically safe due to the myriad 
of enforcement measures and political pressures from other Member States that protect 
such investments.  
 
The most cost effective investment was found to be a local one, the improvement of the 
transmission and distribution grid. Malta being the smallest member of the European 
Union should theoretically have the most efficient grid as the major technical limitation 
on power losses are the distances involved in transmission. Ironically, Malta has the 
second highest losses in the EU mainly as a result of a poor transmission and 
distribution grid coupled with a high degree of electrical energy theft. Efficiency goals 
can be achieved solely through technical improvements of both production and the grid, 
plus the elimination of electrical energy theft. Furthermore a 10% improvement in 
efficiency means that renewable share can be 10% less than originally required (or 9% 
overall) requirement in renewable share compared to a scenario without such 
improvement. It also results in an effective over 10% reduction in overall emissions.  
 
A significant expansion of meter inspection, awareness programs, comprehensive 
installation of the smart meter system, and capital investment to reduce technical losses 
are means by which these goals can be achieved. It is essential that transmission and 
distribution efficiency improvements be pursued aggressively.   
 
Even considering the fact that Sicily has the highest electricity prices in Italy, it still has 
considerably lower electrical energy prices than Malta. The Sicily interconnection is far 
more economic than local non-renewable electricity generation (over 2 c / kWh or 
20%). In addition to being more economic, each unit of energy that is imported rather 
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than produced locally equates to a unit less of emissions and thus less health and 
environmental consequences for the Country. Planned improvements to Sicily‟s power 
transmission infrastructure as well as new connections to the Italian mainland are 
forecast to significantly reduce these prices in the years to come, making an 
interconnection an even more cost-effective investment.  
 
With regard to ensuring achievement of renewable goals, a foreign wind farm (such as 
one similar to Gunfleet Sands, U.K.) would be up to 1 billion Euros more cost effective 
over a local one factoring in a full 25 year time frame. Investing abroad would avoid all 
of various spatial conflicts that would arise as a result of the construction of a local wind 
farm. Additionally, it is not yet known if it is even possible to build the proposed 
traditional monopile offshore structures at selected local sites due to the weak limestone 
bedrock that has been proven to have hidden cavities. 
 
Finally, there is significant room for improvement in consumer end efficiency. 
Domestic lighting and water heating account for almost half of total electrical 
consumption and this share could be reduced by almost 90% with a complete transition 
to compact fluorescent light bulbs and solar water heaters. With regard to private 
industry, current consumer end saving efficiency plans for Malta only loosely target the 
subject with a main focus on savings in the government sector. However, private 
industry should also be incentivized to initiate energy savings through the installation of 
realistic price mechanisms for electrical energy consumption. Residential consumers 
should not have to subsidize Malta‟s private industry.    
 
With full weighting of the Economic, Environmental and Social considerations it is 
recommended that Malta: 
 
i. Improve the efficiency of its transmission and distribution grid by implementing 
aggressive electrical theft countermeasures and grid technical efficiency 
improvements. 
 
ii. Choose electrical interconnection over expansion of local production when 




iii. Invest in foreign offshore wind projects which are far more economic and 
eliminate the land use issues that plague local offshore wind consideration.  
 
iv. Encourage consumer electrical efficiency improvements, especially from the 
industrial sector by implementing a real time electricity pricing system to reflect 
the real price of the generation of electricity. Such a pricing system may be 
politically controversial in the short term as it would probably result in price 
increases from their artificially suppressed levels, but in the long term would result 
in a return to financial sustainability for Enemalta, encourage consumer end 





























The viability of the projects envisioned herein is dependent upon the availability and the 
cost of financing. This section will not predict the future, but will merely summarize 
some of the problems facing Malta in this respect with reference to the key statistics 
displayed in Appendix A. 
 
The EU is the largest economic block in the world with a population of 495,393,000, 
land area of 4,422.993km
2
, and GDP of $14,778,153,000,000. Malta is by far the 
smallest country in the EU with a population of 410,000 (0.08%), land area of 316km2 
(0.01%), and GDP of $9,833,000,000 (0.07%).  
 
For the Euro zone using 2009 estimates the average ratio of Public debt to GDP was 
65.5%, with three countries dangerously overstretched- Belgium 97.6%, Greece 113.4% 
and Italy 115.2%; and all but four of the countries over the 60% Maastricht limit. All 
EU countries are running Fiscal deficits except Finland and Denmark, with all other 
countries except Sweden over the Maastricht level of (3.0%). Malta is running a current 
account balance deficit of $570,000,000, and a Fiscal deficit of 4.7% of GDP. These 
statistics are not long term sustainable and their resolution will certainly impinge on 
Malta‟s ability to fund its deficits. The poor economic climate that has resulted from the 
financial market‟s crash of 2008 mean that economic weighting with regards to energy 
investment is an extremely important factor which is compounded in importance by the 












Appendix A - Statistical Compilation of Malta‟s position in the EU, 
(non Euro Zone Countries in Italics) 
 
 
1-Population (1000‟s) as at Jan. 1, 2008 
 
2-Land Area in km
2 
 
3- Total GDP per annum by Country for 2009 est. in Millions of 
Purchasing Power Parity Dollars 
 
4- GDP per capita per annum, calculated from sections 1 and 3 above 
 
5- Total Electrical Energy Consumption in Giga Watt hours per annum for 
years as shown 
 
6- Electrical Energy Consumption per capita per annum, calculated from 
sections 1 and 5 above, in kWh/capita/annum 
 
7- Public Debt Percent of GDP for 2009 est. 
 
8- Current Account Balance (1,000,000‟s) in exchange rate corrected US 
dollars, 2009 est. 
 
9- Current Account Balance as Percent of GDP from sections 3 and 8 
 



























12 Czech Republic 10,346
13 Hungary 10,045













27 Malta 410            
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14 Austria 83,871             












27 Malta 316  
         Total as Computed     4,422,993 km
2
   
 





































3. Total GDP per annum by Country, EU27 for 2009 est. in Millions of 















13 Czech Republic 254,100













27 Malta 9,833  







































4. GDP per capita per annum, calculated from sections 1 and 3 above: 
[A4] 
 



























27 Bulgaria 11,790  




































5. Total Electrical Energy Consumption in Giga Watt hours per 




1 Germany 547,300 2007 est
2 France 447,200 2007 est
3 United Kingdom 345,800 2007 est
4 Italy 315,000 2007 est
5 Spain 276,100 2008 est
6 Sweden 134,500 2007 est
7 Poland 129,300 2007 est
8 Netherlands 124,100 2008 est
9 Finland 87,250 2008
10 Belgium 84,880 2007 est
11 Austria 66,370 2008 est
12 Czech Republic 61,650 2007 est
13 Greece 58,280 2007 est
14 Romania 49,440 2007 est    
15 Portugal 48,780 2007 est
16 Hungary 37,400 2008 est
17 Denmark 34,300 2008 est
18 Bulgaria 29,900 2008
19 Slovakia 28,750 2009 est
20 Ireland 25,120 2007 est
21 Slovenia 14,700 2009 est
22 Lithuania 9,612 2007 est
23 Estonia 7,686 2007 est
24 Latvia 6,822 2007 est
25 Luxembourg 6,525 2007 est
26 Cyprus 4,277 2007 est
27 Malta 1,832 2007 est  


































6. Electrical Energy Consumption per capita per annum, calculated 
from sections 1 and 5 above, in kWh/capita/annum [A6] 
 
Table A6    












12 Czech Republic 5,959
13 Estonia 5,740
14 Ireland 5,690      












27 Romania 2,308  


















































7. Public Debt Percent of GDP for 2009 by Country EU27, estimated: 
[A7]  
 
     Table A7 



























27 Italy 115.2  









































8. Current Account Balance (1,000,000‟s) in exchange rate corrected 


















14 Malta (570)      
15 Cyprus (2,018)











27 Spain (74,470)  




















































9. Current Account Balance as Percent of GDP from sections 3 and 8, 
[A9]   
 
     Table A9 














14 Czech Republic (0.8)      
15 Poland (1.0)











27 Greece (10.3)    











































   
1 Finland 4.50 2008
2 Denmark 0.00 2010
3 Sweden (2.00) 2010
4 Poland (3.00) 2009
5 Hungary (3.30) 2008
6 Austria (4.00) 2009
7 Belgium (4.00) 2009
8 Bulgaria (4.40) 2010
9 Cyprus (4.40) 2009
10 Netherlands (4.60) 2009
11 Malta (4.70) 2008
12 Czech Republic (5.00) 2010
13 Germany (5.00) 2010
14 Italy (5.00) 2009     
15 Luxembourg (5.00) 2009
16 Slovenia (5.50) 2009
17 Portugal (6.70) 2009
18 Estonia (7.00) 2009
19 Romania (7.00) 2010
20 Slovakia (7.00) 2010
21 Spain (7.90) 2009
22 France (8.00) 2009
23 Latvia (8.00) 2009
24 Lithuania (9.00) 2009
25 Greece (13.70) 2009
26 United Kingdom (14.00) 2010
27 Ireland (15.00) 2010      









































The data for the turnover in the Electric Power Division of Enemalta was taken from the 
Corporation‟s annual reports 2002 through 2008 (last available) and is displayed in the 
table below: 
 
    Table B1 
      From Enemalta Annual Reports
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2008 Together Actual Projected
Year page 66 page 53 page 14 page 70 page 72 page 43  in LM in € in €
2000 48,039 48,039 111,931
2001 51,528 51,528 51,528 120,060
2002 52,910 52,910 52,910 123,280
2003 55,784 55,784 55,784 55,784 129,977
2004 54,770 54,770 54,770 54,770 127,614
2005 70,508 63,577 70,508 164,284
2006 88,548 88,548 206,317













2020 381,354  
 
Note: There is a discrepancy for the year 2005 when comparing the 2006 report and the 
2008 report. Enemalta has not responded to an inquiry regarding this discrepancy. The 
2005 figure in the 2006 report was used because it is closer to the trendline in the Chart 
below. The data for 2002 through 2007 is plotted in the scattergram below, and the 
Excel linear trendline projection equation:  Turnover  = 141127*year# + 98814 





























































































Appendix D – Maltese Islands‟ Rates of Cancer:  Incidence  
                      & Mortality by Region for 2000-03 & 2004-07 
 
 
       Average age-standardized rate per year per 100,000 population
All Cancer Incidence MALES FEMALES
(ex. non-melanoma skin)
2000-03 2004-07 2000-03 2004-07
Southern Harbour 315.96 373.09 262.72 278.09
Northern Harbour 291.92 340.69 263.53 321.40
South Eastern 317.47 357.98 283.66 285.63
Western 304.18 363.35 265.82 302.44
Northern 299.08 303.04 245.36 279.69
Gozo & Comino 280.30 293.53 247.54 284.42
All Cancer Mortality MALES FEMALES
2000-03 2004-07 2000-03 2004-07
Southern Harbour 213.30 229.33 129.36 121.15
Northern Harbour 180.50 201.78 120.52 137.62
South Eastern 170.19 215.76 127.1 137.97
Western 202.75 216.57 113.44 116.07
Northern 151.89 196.05 114.6 119.42
Gozo & Comino 149.64 171.21 113.27 138.81  
Table D1 [A1] 
Results published by the Department of Health Information and Research (DHIR) in 
July 2010 appear on the table above. Data collected by the Malta National Cancer 
Registry was used to identify trends for cancer based upon gender, age, cancer type and 
region of residence.  Patterns appear most markedly in the Southern Harbour District 
and South East District with the highest cancer mortality rate for females  between 
2000-04 and the highest male cancer incidence rate during 2004-07 with South East as 
second highest for same period.  Southern Harbour had the highest mortality rate for all 
cancers among males during 2000-04 and continues to have the highest mortality rate.   
 
Dr. Etienne Grech, M.D., a Maltese G.P., used data from the DHIR 2010 report to write 
an informative piece, an excerpt of which is: 
          “The latest cancer statistics in Malta show a high incidence rate in Zejtun…  
            where there is an age standardised cancer incidence rate of 399.37/100,000 
133 
 
in males (national average 341.19) and 298.58 per 100,000 for women 
(national  average 291.62)… there are also high mortality rates in 
Zejtun…” [A2] 
 
The Southern Harbour and South East regions suffer from emissions from power plants 
as well as heavy emissions from traffic due to the population density.  Constant 
exposure to carcinogens increases the risk of cancer.   
 
    
 
       
 
Figure D1  
The map depicts the radius around Delimara Power Station in the South East 
Region of Malta which has high exposure to toxins emitted from Delimara.  
 The caption on the map is taken from the EIA Report for the Delimara Extension: 








Appendix E - Wind Farm Statistics 
 
Figure E1: Projection of wind energy density in Europe for 2030 indicating the  



















Figure E2: Generation Costs for Wind Energy Europe 2020  Note: Malta is shown 
as „red‟ which is the highest cost/kWh 
 
 


















Chart E1: Offshore capital investment cost is shown peaking 2008-10, declining 
precipitiously thereafter, and continuing on a downward cost trend to 2030 
 
 
Chart E1 [A2] 
Figure E3: Wind map of the Mediterranean Sea region showing Malta in a low 






Chart E2:  2010 is at the apex of the curve for cost of installation of wind farms:  





As can be seen from the chart above, wind farm investments that are made in 2010 are 
at the pinnacle of the projected capital cost (capex) curve. Investments in a wind farm of 
a certain capacity made today will be almost 40% more expensive than investments 


















Figure E4: Location of Potential Offshore Sites in Malta & Gozo with legend showing built-up areas, primary 




Chart E3: Cost of wind energy for offshore wind farms constructed in 2007 shown as cost/kWh plotted against  





Figure E5: Photomontage of Sikka l-Bajda from Ghadira Bay: this view is taken from a popular tourist area; thus the 
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